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INTRODUeTION
 
1
 
Purpose of The Study v.. -,
 
The electric utility indus:try ih the United States is now,
 
and has been in varying degrees since its inception, pluralistic
 
in nature. It is composed of investor-owned systems (private),
 
local municipal systems owned by various comniunities, public^
 
owned cooperatives, and state and federal projects. As a single
 
entity, it provides the consumers of electric power in this country
 
with energy which, at the retail level, is genera.lly responsive
 
to consumer needs and reasonably priced.^ This, however, has not
 
always been the prevalent situation in the industry. As I shall
 
point out in Chapter 2, the early days were fraught with non­
competitive practices, lack of service, and unrealistically high
 
rate structures.
 
As a result of the many shortcomings within the industry
 
during its formative years, the public sector of the economy-

began to provide increasing segments of the populatibn with
 
electric power which they had either been denied by the priyate
 
sector or they felt themselves to be paying exorbitant rates.
 
As a result, the multi-ownership pluralisitt of the providers 
within the industry became directly piopbrtionaK^ the. ■ Gontrb­
versial rhetoric. Both sides have attempted, and in many cases 
succeeded, to politicize the issues to attain their self-perceived 
ends. According to Wildavsky,^ 
Participation in politics han come to be a normal
 
concomitant of the power business:. 
 V
 
The pblemic debate has now polarized itself into two major factions:
 
the public power advocates generally personified in the image of
 
the American Public Power Association (APPA) and the private
 
power interests speaking through the voice of the Edison Electric
 
Institute (EEI).
 
The APPA consistently publishes data which, it claims,
 
proves that publicly-owried electric systems provide less costly
 
power for the consumer and are more responsive to their needs.
 
As such, claims the APPA, publicly-owned systems are more bene
 
ficial to America. Not At all intimidated by these claims, the
 
EEI dilutes these assertions with counterpoints. If lower rates
 
do exist for some publicly-owned systems,^ then the primary ­
reason for this apparent benefit is that the publicly-owned
 
systems pay little, if any, taxes. Another reason they generally
 
mention is that the public systems may have competitive rates
 
because they have the advantage of the large scale generation
 
projects^ power pools, and high voltage transmission systems
 
installed at the expense of the investor-owned utilities.^ The
 
publicly-owned systems, then, benefit from the investments of
 
the private Utilities by being able to purchase wholesale
 
power for resale at a cost less than they would incur if they
 
had to generate it themselves.
 
Taxation, or the lack of it, however, is the most significant
 
cost savings for the nation's public power systems. To quote
 
from the EEI:^
 
At present, the nonpayment of taxes is the most
 
important advantage municipal electric systems have
 
over electric companies and this is obviously unfair
 
to the 78 percent of the electric customers in the
 
country that are served by (private) electric companies.
 
  
It is indeed anomalous that, in our ptiyate enter
 
prise society, customers o£ investor-owned enter
 
prises are penalized by having to pay in the cost of
 
their electric service substantially higher taxes
 
, than the customers of government-owned electric
 
systems.
 
. . . electric companies paid about 4 times the taxes
 
as did these government-owned electric systems (in
 
■ 1972) .. ■ ■ 
Municlpal systems. Since their inception, have been condemned
 
as wasteful of taxpayers' dollars, overt socialism, and a major
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encroachment on private enterprise in a capitalistic society.
 
Prior Studies
 
Numerous studies have been done to ascertain which type of
 
ownership is more beneficial to the ultimate consumer. Most,
 
as I have already mentioned in the prior section, tend to be
 
published by groups with vested interests and are therefore
 
subject to inherent, if not manipulated, biases. Two studies
 
that I reviewed during the research phase for this paper, however,
 
warrant special mention.
 
Robert^A. Meyer,^ in his comparative analysis of public
 
versus private ownership of electric utilities, used a sample
 
from the nationwide statistics applicable to the electric utility
 
industry. His emphasis, while he did evaluate costs. Was to
 
determine which sector was using the least cost technology
 
available. The data covered the years 1967, 1968, and 1969.
 
Through the application of duality theorems evaluating bivariate
 
data, he established that the public systems, on a nationwide
 
average, had lower production costs and that transmission costs
 
were about equal in both sectors. Distribution and maintenance
 
costs, while substantially on a par, slightly favored public
 
systems as bein-g less expensive/ Rates, He found, were signi
 
ficantly lower in the public sector. His Study of typical monthly
 
bills consistently found the private sector to be charging 8% ­
281 more than that charged by public firms for the same consump­
'tion level'. .
 
The other study of significance regarding this public vs.
 
private ownership dichotomy was conducted by Audie L. Bevins, Jr.^
 
He neither evaluated cost of Service nor rates, as is commonly the
 
situation, but consumers attitudes and preferences. His sample
 
included five of Wyoming's sixteen municipal systems and two
 
large communities in that state served by privately-owned electric
 
systems. The results of his study inferred that consumers cur
 
rently being served by municipal systems were in favor of public
 
power (97.6%); that they were satisfied with the cost of
 
electricity; felt that public power profits were a fair way to
 
raise money for this community (88.8%); and did not conceive of
 
their utility bill as a form of taxation (89.7%). Residents who
 
resided in the communities,served by the privately-owned utilities
 
had, surprisingly, similar views. They were generally in favor
 
of municipal power systems and were about evenly divided on the
 
issue of whether or not their community should opt for a public
 
power system (41.3% yes - 46.7% no). Those in favor generally
 
cited possible lower costs as the reason while those opposed
 
generally claimed that public power was socialistic or that\their
 
bills would be higher.
 
  I 
Statement of Purpose
 
' My purpose, then, mlT be to re-evaluate the question ;
 
concerning which type of ownership is more beneficial to the
 
consumer; public or private. The scope of the analysis will
 
be primarily economic, and the population to be evaluated
 
will be geographically limited to the State of California. This
 
is being done to keep the data at a manageable level and to
 
eliminate, as much as is possible, any inherent biases that might
 
be undetected and included in a survey of national proportion.
 
■ 	 Hypotheses
 
To evaluate the major topic of the viability of publicly-

owned 	electric systems in California, three major hypotheses
 
manifest themselves as being critical to; the analysis. It is
 
my opinion, based on a review of the prior research on the
 
subject, that publicly-owned systems must fulfill, at least over
 
the long run, two major criteria. They must offer, to the
 
ultimate consumer, energy at equal or less cost than he could
 
purchase it from a privately-owned supplier and, secondly, the
 
municipal system must provide in-lieu tax payments or general
 
government subsidies equal to the tax effort that would be made
 
by a privately-owned firm in the same jurisdiction. If these
 
criteria are not met, then the public system offers no economic
 
advantage to the consumer and taxpayer of that community. At this
 
juncture, I would like to state some caveats regarding this study
 
and, by implication, previous studies of the same nature.
 
The electric power industry is dynamic, not static, in
 
nature. This is especially true since the Arab oil embargo
 
impacted the industry and caused rates to escalate in geometric
 
progression.^'^ As it is a dynamic industry, this study, and
 
any other of an economic nature, only takes a still-life picture
 
of the situation at a single point in time. These "balance
 
sheet reports" will have to be constantly updated for signifi
 
cant trending data to develop. As such, I wish to state that
 
the results I obtain will be of how the industry in California
 
was in 1975, not necessarily how it is now or if the same
 
relationships continue to exist. The reader is also cautioned
 
to note that this study applies to California only. No ambiguous
 
inference should be projected to encoropass the entire population
 
Of publicly-owned'Or privately-owned utilities.
 
The hypothesis testing will be classical in nature and ^ ­
represent an objective view. We will reject or fail to reject
 
each null hypothesis on the statistical significance of the
 
results Obtained according to normal testing procedures. As is
 
generally the case in the classical mbde, the alternative hypo
 
thesis will be the logical statemeht of the regular hypothesis.
 
Rates
 
Our first hypothesis, then, concerns the rates paid to
 
utilities by ultimate consumers. Power sold for resale is not
 
to be included at this time as it would not apply evenly across
 
all classes of utility ownership and may tend to distort the
 
results. The data will be reviewed, analyzed, and tested with
 
the expected result that rates charged by publicly-owned systems
 
will be equal or less than those rates charged by privately-

owned utilities for similar quantities of energy.
 
 In operational terms, the hypothesis can be stated:
 
HqI 	 Publicly-owned utility charges for electrical
 
energy consumption are equal to or less ( )
 
than those charges for the same consumption
 
from a privately-owned utility.
 
Publicly-owned utility charges for electrical 
energy consumption are greater ( >■ ) than those 
charges for the same consumption from a privately­
' owned utility. 
Cost 	of Service 
If the first operational objective is substantiated, we will 
want to ascertain how any apparent lower rates are accomplished. 
It logically follows that we will Want to evaluate the cost of 
service for the different classes of ownership. Cost of service 
is interpreted to include, for reasons of equal cbmparison. Pro 
duction, Transmission, .Distribution, Customer Account, and Admin 
istrative Expenses. It is recognized that there are also other 
expenses that would be meaningful, such as debt service and capital 
outlay. The initial review of the available data, however, indicates 
that these components are so thoroughly occluded in the various 
reports to be utilized that their inclusion would create exceptional 
biases in the true cost of service, especially for the privately-
owned utilities. A more.relevant comparison can be obtained if 
we ignore these items and assume that they are paid out of 
current depreciation, which is analyzed, and net profit. 
Our basic premise, then, is that publicly-owned utilities 
have equal to or lower cost of service per kilowatt-hour (KWH) of 
sales. Stated operationally, the hypothesis becomes: 
Hq: 	 Publicly-owned utilities have an overall cost of
 
service which is equal to or less f^ ) than
 
privately-owned systems.
 
H^: 	Publicly-owned utilities have an overall cost
 
of service which is greater '(3;^) than privately-

owned systems. :
 
Tax Effort
 
The last area of comparability that will be tested, and an
 
important one, is tax effort. As will be discussed in Chapter 3,
 
various sources were required to acquire the correct data. In
 
one source document, the municipal systems were given no, or
 
only partial, credit for in-lieu tax contributions. In the
 
same document, the private systems had a tax payment published
 
which resulted from their total operations, not 3'ust electric
 
sales. I suspect that this situation has'snared many an unwary
 
researcher in the past and has, perhaps, led somewhat to the
 
current tax effort controversy. It is my contention, however,
 
that publicly-owned,systems, in the aggregate, have a.tax effort
 
that is not significantly different from that of the investor-

owned firms. Stated operationally, the hypothesis becomes:
 
Hq: 	There is ^ (=) significant difference in the
 
tax effort between publicly vs. privately-owned
 
utilities. 	 '
 
There is a (?^) significant difference in tax
 
effort between publicly vs. privately-owned
 
utilities.
 
Methodology
 
The various prpcedures utilized for accumulating, analyzing,
 
and testing the data will be discussed in detail in each of the
 
appropriate chapters. As an overview, however, the sample of
 
utilities will be as complete as possible. All three of the
 
major privately-owned utilities will be included as well as all
 
of the publicly-owned systems included in the various reports
 
who have sales to ultimate customers:. Federal and state projects 
will be excluded so as not to distort the results. 
Chapter Preview ' ■ 
Chapter 2 will cover, in a summary sense, the evolution
 
of public power systems in the^United States in both a
 
national perspective and within California. In Chapter 3,
 
all of the data relevant to the study will be analyzed and
 
any discrepancies will be discussed. Chapter 4 will devote
 
itself to testing the hypotheses as stated in the intro
 
duction and in Chapter 5 the results will be evaluated and
 
discussed.
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 Chapter 2
 
EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC POWER SYSTEMS
 
National Development
 
Publicly-owned systems for the generation, transmission,
 
and distribution of electrical energy have been a part of the
 
total power industry within the United States since the advent
 
of the industry in 1882. It was in that year that Thomas
 
Edison demonstrated the feasibility of providing low cost
 
power for street lighting at his Pearl Street Station in New
 
York .City. On that day, an industry was born. Municipal
 
systems such as Danville, Virginia, Danvers, Massachusetts,
 
and Detroit Lakes, Minnesota, date from the inceptiqn of this
 
industry on the American scene.^ Today, approximately 14%, or
 
30 million Americans, receive their electric power from local,
 
publicly-owned, electric utilities. Another 91, or 19 million
 
citizens, receive their electric energy needs from rural
 
- 2 ■ 
electric cooperatives. Although both publicly-owned and
 
investor-owned utilities appear to co-exist in relative calm
 
at the present, this has not always been the situation. The
 
past is liberally laced with much acrimonious debate on which
 
type of system, publicly-owned or investor-owned, is better
 
suited to provide the public the electric power it needs for a
 
progressive and industrial society.
 
-11­
In no other American industry have such fierce battles
 
been fought over which sector of the economy, the public or
 
private, should provide the consumer with electrical energy.
 
As ours is a capitalistic society, it has always worked out well
 
when private investment developed the necessary:plant and
 
competively marketed its product to the consumer. Unfortu
 
nately, the electric power industry,; in order to avoid wastes
 
of capital investment resulting from the duplication of plant
 
and equipment, will work best when there is no competition.
 
Electric utilities must be a monopoly if costs are to be minimized.
 
And monopolies must be regulated by the government if we are to
 
be assured that the people do not suffer unwarranted abuses
 
and unrealistically high prices. It appears, from the evidence
 
as cited, that the failure of the regulatory process as applied
 
to investor-owned electric utilities in the past was by far the
 
most prominent impetus for the development of the large
 
government owned and operated electric systems, such as the
 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and Bonneville Power Adminis
 
tration (BPA) that are so prominent on the national level today.
 
Public ownership of any industry that provides a societal
 
nebd is only necessary where effective regulation does not
 
exist. If the private investor-Owned firm can produce results ,
 
favorable to the public's advantage, while still earning a
 
fair return on its. investment, the need for public ownership
 
ceases to exist.^
 
 From the iiidustry's earliest moments, electric power was
 
looked upon as a social good. It was to be a commodity for
 
the betterment of all. It would be a major consumer necessity
 
for proyiding the good life; the American dream. As such, its
 
cost to the consumer would have to be controlled because its
 
very naturb of^^^^ d tended to^3.rd monopolistic practices.
 
From 1882^ through 1907, government felt that the best way
 
to control the industry and the prices it charged to the con
 
sumer was to promote vigorous competition within the;industry
 
amongst multiple investor-owned systems. It was felt that
 
by awarding many service franchises to a multiplicity of firms,
 
one firm to a section of the governmental entity, such
 
competition would regulate rates and provide an impetus for
 
reliable service levels. Unfortunately, such a scheme did not
 
work out in practice. As is generally the case in a free market
 
society, the larger and stronger firms simply absorbed those
 
that were less economically sound. The end result in many
 
areas of the country was the creation of large,unregulated
 
4 . ' ■ 
monopolies. The scheme of promoting vigorous competition
 
amongst privately owned competitors had failed.
 
By 1907, these giants of the industry had solidified their
 
position in the economic sense. They had created powerful
 
monopolies and holding companies which determined who would
 
get electrical energy, when they would receive it, and how much
 
they would pay. They were also astute enough to know that this
 
type of situation would not survive forever. Already the
 
 public and the "Populist Reform Movement'' were clamdting for
 
a national power policy and public ownership of the electriGal
 
industry. It was about this same time (1907) that the private
 
investor-owned utilities saw state regulation of their opera
 
tions as the lessor of the major eVils with which they might
 
/	 have to contend. They preferred such regulation as more accept
 
able to the alternatives of municipal-ownership and/or compet
 
ition in their hard won service areas.^
 
Regulation of these private companies, however, was not
 
the panacea so many had envisioned. During the ensuing years,
 
the utilities took the state regulatory commissions to court
 
as particular cases warranted. By their actions, they succeeded
 
in building a body of case law which protected their own special
 
interests. 	 - • ' , ' . '■ ■ 
The industry,thus became more and more
 
reconciled to state regulation, while
 
large segments of the public became more
 
and more dissatisfied.^ v
 
The situation had deteriorated, at least in the eyes of the
 
public power advocates, to the point where it appeared that
 
the private interests had sought control of the government
 
in order to avoid being controlled.^
 
The result was political corruption in
 
American municipalities, for which public

ownership was to be a remedy.^
 
The remedy, however, was looked upon by the private interests
 
as an unwarranted intrusion of government into the private
 
sector. It was blatant socialism. Cities, it was reasoned
 
by the private business interests, should not undertake any
 
-IS- :■ . 
ventures which are profitable; such ventures will always be 
underta-ken more efficiently by private enterprise.^ Early 
court cases, however, took a much different viewpoint. The 
courts reasoned that an enlargement of municipal activity under 
the implied powers concept would provide greater opportunities 
and benefits for the populace in general. . They viewed the for 
mation of municipally owned electric utilities as a positive 
action of government Vis-a-vis a strictly police action as^mani­
fested in the regulation 6f private firms providing the sa-me 
service.10 This attitude is succinctly presented in the court's 
decision concerning the City of Henderson vs. Young (83S.W.; 583) 
as cited in Pond.^1 In this action, the court felt that the 
plaintiff's challenge against municipal ownership and operatibn 
of the city's electrical system was not substantiated. The 
court's judgment said, in part: 
In the management and operation of its 
electric light plant, a city is not 
exercising its governmental or legisla
tive powers, but its business powers,
nnd may conduct it in the manner Which 
promises the greatest benefit to the city
and its inhabitants in the judgment of the 
City Council; and it is not within the 
province of the court to interfere. . . in 
such matters. 
This landmark decision provided a sound legal basis for the 
formulation of municipal electric systems and at the same time 
placed the regulatory function for such systems in the hands 
of the local elected officials. 
By this time in our history, public power interests were 
beginning to marshal their forces and move ahead on large 
-16- Vv :
 
national level programs. For the reformers In American
 
politics, public ownership of electrical Systems was a
 
countervailing power of government to keep the greedy
 
private interests under control and to make the natural
 
resources of the nation aV'ailable to all of the people.
 
On June 3, 1916, the reformers, and others of similar
 
persuasion, witnessed theiplanting of the seed that would '
 
someday lift a vast segment of America out of the depths
 
of poyerty and provide ample low-cost electric power for
 
millions of Americans. On that day. Congress approved the
 
National Defense Act which empowered the government to
 
harness the Tennessee Rivbr for nitrate and fertilizer pro
 
duction. The production of these products would require
 
vast amounts of electrical energy which would be provided
 
by the many dam sites to be constructed for taming the river.
 
Unfortunately, it was not until 1933, or seventeen years
 
later, that the project which became known as the Tennessee
 
Valley Authority (TVA) wbuld bear fruit. The. private power
 
interests marshalled all the forces at their command to stop
 
this socialistic monster.
 
From the end of World War I through 1928, nearly every
 
session of Congress was disrupted over the question of
 
whether or not to surrender the still incomplete project.to '
 
private investors or have the government complete it. The
 
private utilities wanted to take over the project but they
 
lacked the necessary capital investment. Senator Norris of
 
-17­
Nebraska, in opposition to the private interests> wanted all
 
o£ the power generating sites within the watershed to remain
 
under federal control. In fact, it was his intention to develop
 
a national public power syste'ih such as those prevalent in Europe.
 
So intense was the debate during the years following the end of
 
World War I that the power generation capability of the only
 
completed TVA site, that at Muscle Shoals in northwestern Alabama,
 
sat idle and unused or, if generation was permitted, the production
 
was dumped at ridiculously low rates to the monopolistic private
 
utility operating at the plant site. This sad state of affairs
 
was a direct result of Congressional inability, primarily those
 
of Republican persuasion, and the Republican Administrations of
 
the period, to approve the construction of government owned and
 
controlled transmission and distribution lines from the plant
 
site to the rural consumers. It was not until 1932 that TVA
 
began to gather any national support. The turning point was
 
the emergence of a powerful Democratic administration.
 
During Franklin D. Roosevelt's campaign for the presidential
 
election in 1932, he championed the promulgation of publicly-

owned power projects to facilitate the broadest consumption of
 
power to strengthen a then faltering economy. He also knew, from
 
his previous experience as a staunch promoter of the then
 
fledgling New York State Power Authority (NYSPA) created in
 
1931 when he was governor of that state, that publicly-owned
 
systems would act as an effective comparative regulatory yard
 
stick against investor owned monopolies. The NYSPA was
 
created in 1931 after a long and bitter fight with the
 
private power interests. Its major philosophy, and one that
 
Roosevelt now ehampioned at the national level, was that regu^
 
lation of the private companies had been ineffective and thaf
 
government competition had to be substituted in place of
 
co-opted regulatory commissions. The authority planned to
 
accomplish these goals by developing the St. Lawrence Seaway
 
for navigation. In so doing, it would construct a series of
 
dams with hydro-electric generating capacity. The largest of
 
these sites is now located at Niagara Falls on the U.S./Canadian
 
border. Wholesale power generated at these sites would then
 
be sold to private investor-owned utilities under the stipu
 
lation that specific retail rates, set by the Authority, would
 
be charged to the consumer. These retail rates were not arbi
 
trary but were the result of extensive engineering studies and
 
set at reasonable levels. To digress a moment, it might be
 
interesting to cite that the development of the St. Lawrence
 
Power Project was successfully thwarted by the private power
 
interests in the legislature until 1950. At that time, when
 
the Authority adopted an attitude on non-competition with the
 
private interests, objection^ were withdrawn and the project
 
began in 1952.^^
 
During Roosevelt's first year in office as president, he
 
successfully launched the TVA as a government owned power
 
industry. In 1933, the Tennessee Valley Authority Act (1933)
 
was passed into law by Congress. The Act provided TVA with
 
the ability and resources to construct the power lines required
 
 to deliver the electrical energy from the hydro sites to the
 
consumers. The backs o£ the private utilities were broken.
 
They had been content to let the authority develop the entire
 
river as long as they took control of all the power at the
 
point of geiieration. With TVA now in the transmission and
 
distribution business as well, it was able to cut retail
 
electric ra.tes for the consumers by approximately 60 percent.
 
TVA had proved, once the political constraints were
 
removed, that it was good for the industry to have government
 
Sponsbred competition; at least in that area CSoutheastern
 
United States) at that time. Prior to TVA there was no compe
 
tition, or yardstick c|oncept, for the region, albeit, there
 
was regulation. After the Authority's' creation and its intro
 
duction of lower retail rates, the surrounding private ^
 
utilities (Alabama Power and Georgia Power Cpmpanies) in the
 
area reduced their rates. They also began to aggressively
 
seek out new consumers where before they had argued that new
 
customers were not cost-effective (i.e., the cost to serve them
 
'	exceeded, the revenues to be gained). Where previously all deci
 
sions as to whom to serve were purely rationalized from an
 
economic perspective, now they sought to grab as much territory
 
as possible from the emerging government giant. This aggressive
 
expansion was continued by the private interests until 1939-40.
 
At that time, a "gentlemen's agreement" was entered into by
 
the Authority and the private utilities which defined the
 
geographic limits of TVA's service area. After that agreement
 
was made, both Alabama Power and Georgia Power exhibited a
 
■ - '■^-■ -:'­
helovr a^rerage gvovtlii^ in neTfi CAxs is indicative of 
not aggressively seeking out new business. It appears that 
they regressed from competitive to monopolistic practices oncer 
assured that TVA would not encroach further on their service | 
areas. Also, once the threat of direct competitidn lessened;, 
the private utilities increased their retail power rates. [ 
TVA successfully settled a regional problem regarding the 
supply of electric power for all at reasonable rates. But thei. 
problem had a national perspective. For example, according to^ 
the 1930 Census of Agriculture, an estimated 654,680 (10.4%) of 
America's 6,295,000 farms were electrified.^^ It was obvious 
that the private, investor-owned, utilities had not developed 
an effective prdgram to provide power to America's rural areas. 
They argued that the cost of;developing and maintaining electric 
systems in such sparsely populated areas had minimal return on 
the investment of capital required. In response to such a 
negative position, the proponents of rural electrification called 
for massive government assistance. The fight, however, was to 
be long and hard in the political/industrial arena. 
In 1923, Governor GiffordPinchot of Pennsylvania author 
ized the' first "Giant Power Survey. Its primary aim was to 
coordinate development of the state's power resources by 
private utilities under state regulation and planning. The 
survey, when completed, called for"holding company regulation, 
lower rates for consumers, conservation, more efficient utiliz 
ation of coal for power, and electrification of all farms in 
the rural counties. When in 1926, the State Public Utilities
 
Commission (PA) ordered the private utilities to extend elec
 
trical service into the rural areas of the state, "the order
 
was ignored with impunity ^ Unfortunately, this problem was
 
not limited to the State of Pennsylvania.
 
As with the creation of TVA, the program to electrify
 
America's farms received its biggest support from the Roose
 
velt Administration. Interestingly, however, the support was
 
subsidiary to the administration's main target, that of breaking
 
up the giant holding companies which controiled most of the
 
operating utilities. On May 11, 1935,
 
In the course of the legislative fight to
 
break up the power trust by striking
 
directly at holding-dompany control, Roose
 
velt issued an Executive Order temporarily s
 
creating the Rural Eiectrification Adminis
 
tration (REA).26
 
The REA was created in order to provide capital funds at sub­
stantially lower interest rates in order that the poorer rural
 
areas of the nation could obtain inexpensive electric power.
 
It. was originally envisioned to be a mutually beneficial and
 
cooperative effort between government and the private utilities.
 
The government would provide the funding at low interest rates
 
and the private utilities would devplop the necessary facilities.
 
But, the schism had been made. The private utilities would have
 
no part in such a socialistic policy. Because of shortsighted
 
goals and a fear of government control, the private utilities
 
refused REA funding. The long and acrimonious battles between
 
utility management and the populist politicians had bred a
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mutual distrust, l£ REA were to become a reality, it would have
 
to be a wholly public enterprise.
 
Oh May 20, 1936, the, REA was given permanent status by the
 
Congress. There are some who speculate that it was passed not
 
as a plan to electrify the nation's rural areas, but more as a
 
method of increasing employment during that era of national
 
depression. Also, interestingly enough, there were minimal
 
lobbying efforts by the private power interests at that point in
 
time. Most apparently felt that this was just another New Deal
 
program and, as such, was bound to be a short term problem.29
 
The growing success of REA, however, soon made it a prime
 
target of the private utilities.
 
Their strategy was to forestall it by
 
•	 moving into some profitabie areas that
 
hitherto were ignored and to impede the
 
REA's system of area coverage by build­
■■ 	 ing lines that attracted just enough , 
potential customers to make the organ­
■ ■ ization of an REA cooperative impossible. 
By very carefully planning the erection of single lines through 
projected REA districts, they successfully fragmented the districts 
so that all economies of scale would be lost. The REA district 
would find itself forced to form many smaller systems at a higher 
cost than they would have had to bear had the larger single system 
been developed. Some operating companies acted in even more of 
a disreputable manner. Texas Power and Light Company, for example, 
successfully persuaded an official of the Department of Agriculture 
to disclose the specifics concerning the first Texas cooperative. 
The Company then built many dissecting lines through the area to 
make the formation of the cooperative financially prohibitive. 
It is also interesting to note that the Company had previously
 
refused to serve this area because of the economics involved.^^
 
Another tactic utilized by the private utilities to hinder
 
and/or destroy the cooperatives was to lobby for the cooperatives
 
to be placed under state regulatory control. In Massachusetts
 
they were successful. Soon after, the State Public Utilities
 
Commission.rendered an unfavorable ruling which destroyed that
 
state's largest cooperative.^^ 1
 
In spite of allthe obstacles, however, the REA is a
 
success. As a competitor, it forced private companies to serve
 
areas which they had previously shunned. A more positive
 
evaluation, however, is the 5.5 million Customers, or 19 million
 
citizens, that receive.their electrical needs through rural
 
cooperatives.
 
Development of large scale, government funded and sponsored,
 
electric power systems was not only limited to the industrial
 
east and the economically depressed south, however. Roosevelt,
 
as well as other prominent advocates of public power systems,
 
wanted national development on a large scale. The culmination
 
of this ideal was the development of the hydro-electric resources
 
in the Pacific Northwest under the guidance of the Bonneville
 
Power Administration (BPA).
 
Bonneville, as the first of many western projects, was to
 
improve navigation along the Columbia River by constructing
 
a series of dams. As with the TVA, a beneficial externality of
 
this endeavor was toi be the generation of huge amounts of hydro
 
electric power. The project was seen as an integral part of
 
i 
the New Deal program for conservation and development of natural
 
resources for the benefit of all people in America. The 

investor-owned utilities in the region, however, as in the
 
development of TVA, were contentfo have the government develop
 
the resources as long as they took delivery of the power at the
 
point of generation for subsequent delivery and sale to the
 
ultimate consumers. A bitter struggle ensued between the public
 
power advocates who wanted independent administration of the
 
project for the benefit of all consumers and the private utility
 
interests. The private utilities wanted the entire project to
 
be administered by the Corps of Engineers whose rate making and
 
distribution policies were quite favorable to the private sector.
 
The Engineers' prime concern was the navigational aspects of the
 
project; the sale of electricity was of secondary importance, and
 
as such, they had a tendency to dump the generated electricity at
 
ridiculously low rates as a matter of convenience.^^
 
On August 20, 1937, Roosevelt signed into law the Bonneville
 
Power Act. It was in itself a victory for both sides in the
 
bitter dispute. The Corps of Engineers were to be responsible
 
for the generation and sale of the electric power that was
 
generated at each dam site. The rates to be charged, however, were
 
to be determined by a civilian administrator working within the
 
Department of Interior. Under this arrangement, the private
 
utilities would still get most of the power generated, but they
 
would pay reasonable rates and not be subsidized at government
 
expense. The Act also provided for the interconnection of all
 
Federal Projects in the region. It was felt that this neophyte
 
of a national grid system^^ would benefit all public power
 
projects, especially those not yet completed.^^ The Act
 
further envisioned that the greatest benefits would accrue after
 
the interconnection of all privately-owned systems to the grid as
 
well as the publicly-owned ones. This/however, was not com
 
pleted until the advent of World Warll. The War Production
 
Board accomplished what years of negotiation could not. War'
 
Production Board Order 1-94 interconnected the federal system at
 
Bonneville with all major electrical systems in the area.
 
This system, which the private interests vehemently opposed, is
 
still in operation to this date.
 
Development Within California
 
In many respects, the development of publicly owned electric
 
power systems in California is a microcosm of the national effort.
 
A majoy distinction, however, is that most California systems are
 
municipal in scope and concerned with the distribution of power
 
at the retail level as a result of the lack of private initiative
 
in developing electric systems in the unprofitable suburban cpm­
munities or, in cities where private interests had developed
 
adequate systems, as a means of lowering rates which were con
 
sidered excessive at the time.
 
The first city in California to acquire and operate its own
 
electric system was Alameda in 1887 Initially, it acquired
 
the plant from a private company for the purpose of street light
 
ing only. In 1898, eleven years later, it expanded its service
 
area to include residential and cornmercjial customers as well.
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Palo Alto (1898) and Ukiah.(1899) embarked into the electric
 
power business by buying out the private systems that were already
 
serving the communities. Both public systems were initiated
 
after voter approval, but for different reasons. In Palo Alto,
 
the people were dissatisfied over the high rates being charged
 
for service by the private company. After acquisition by the
 
city, the rates for electricity were reduced by one half. In
 
spite of this massive reduction in revenues, the Palo Alto system
 
continued to show an operating profit. Ukiah, however, found it
 
necessary to enter the power business because the private system
 
serving the area had been unsuccessful and failed.
 
Anaheim (1894), Colton (1896), Riverside (1896), and
 
Santa Clara (1896) are furthfer examples of California cities which
 
entered the industry by default.-^ At the time that the citizens
 
of these communities desired the advantages of electrical power
 
and street lighting, there Were no private firms willing to
 
provide such services. It has also been noted that there was a
 
strong Populist sentiment in these communities at the time for
 
municipal vis-a-vis private ownership. Again, all of these
 
systems were supported by approval of the voters to sell the,
 
necessary bonds for the initial capital investment.
 
Roseville (1910) is an example of a California community
 
which entered into direct competition with a privately-owned '
 
utility. One of the city councilmen, upon learning that the
 
cost of producing and delivering the electrical energy sold in
 
the city was considerably less than that cost which the consumers
 
were paying, launched a campaign that the city should have its
 
own system. The private company, however, refused to sell its
 
facilities. Therefore, the city, after voter approval, built
 
its own system and went into direct competition. Roseville
 
instituted a fifty cent flat monthly rate and, in spite of the
 
relatively low rate, showed an operating profit. The private
 
firm was forced, because.of the competition, to lower its rates.
 
The city then lowered its flat rate to twenty-five cents per
 
month. In 1920, the private firm called it quits and sold all
 
of its facilities to the city.
 
Burbank (1913), in contrast, had encouraged the private
 
development of its electrical system. When the private
 
utility found itself unable to complete the project, the city
 
voted a bond issue, purchased the partially completed system,
 
and has been in the power business ever since.
 
Not all of the municipal ventures into the power industry
 
have been easy or without intense confrontation. It appears
 
that when government developed systems in areas hot served by
 
private interests, or in marginal profit areas, the fight to
 
halt this public encroachment on the private sector was minimal,
 
if any was made at all. However, when government attempted to
 
take over a high density urban are'a the fighting was long and
 
bitter. Such was the case with the development of the Los Angeles
 
Municipal Electric System. The acquisition of that system from
 
the private utilities consumed eight years of litigation and
 
much acrimonious debate and political obstruction.'^^
 
The distribution and sale of electric energy by a publicly-

owned power company in the City of Los Angeles manifested itself
 
as a natural by-product from the development of tjxat city's
 
supply system bringing water from the high Sierras. On its
 
long trek from the mountains, this aqueduct falls approximately
 
3,000 feet, a natural condition for the installation of multiple
 
hydro-electric generating facilities. Over a span of years, tbe
 
system was carefully designed to extract the maximum generation
 
from the water flow and the plans for such installations were
 
approved in 1910. In 1911, the electorate of Los Angeles
 
approved, by a margin of ten to one, the municipal distribution
 
of such electric power vis-a-vis its sale to the private com
 
panies for resale to them.
 
The aqueduct system was completed in 1914, but it was not
 
until the spring of 1917, a full three years behind schedule,
 
that electric power generated by the aqueduct system began to
 
flow, on a limited basis, to the citizens of Los Angeles.
 
The Bureau of Power had, since the inception of the idea
 
for forming a municipal utility, tried unsuccessfully to acquire
 
the facilities of the private companies then serving the city.
 
In 1916, after extensive negotiations failed, the city began
 
to construct its own facilities on a limited basis. After only
 
a few months of this limited competition, the municipal system
 
was able to take over approximately seventy percent of the
 
customers previously served by the private companies in those
 
areas. When the Bureau of Power threatened to expand its service
 
area, one of the private firms. Southern California Edison, 
reali
zed
 
it could not compete and agreed to sell its facilities within the
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Bureau's operating area. The other private firm, the Los,
 
Angeles Gas and Electric System^ refused to surrender its
 
facilities. The litigation that followed consumed another
 
six years. It was not until May, 1922, that the Bureau obtained
 
ownership through purchase of the facilities of the private
 
firms within its operational area. The use of obstructive and
 
adroit litigation proved to be the most effective weapon in the
 
private utilities arsenal to delay, if not prevent, the success
 
ful formation of a municipal system in an area previously
 
served by them. In the Los Angeles case, more than thirty
 
law suits were filed by the private power companies during the
 
six year period.
 
In California, it was the development of municipal hoire
 
rule that proved to be the greatest impetus for the creation of
 
municipally-owned electric systems. The cities, being closer to
 
the problems of the people, could react to serve the citizens
 
with adequate power at reasonable rates. The state, which
 
tried to regulate the private power companies through its Rail
 
road Commission, was too far removed from the problems to be
 
effective. In fact, prior to 1910, the state didn't, seem con
 
cerned about the equitable distribution and sale of electric
 
power. In that year, two major events occurred that insured
 
the survival of municipal power systems. First, the California
 
Supreme Court dec1ared;.48
 
"There is no provision in our state
 
constitution which either expressly or
 
by implication forbids the acquisition,
 
ownership, or operation of any such
 
public utilities by a municipality, or
 
prohibits the power to acquire, own, or
 
operate them."
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The right of a municipality to operate an electric system had 
been favorably resolved in the courts Second, and probably 
more important and far reaching, was the overthrow of the 
Southern Pacific machine in California politics by the election 
of Hiram Johnson as governor. His election spurred the legis 
lature to pass many progressive measures Including, in 1911, 
the right of municipal governments to acquire, own, and operate 
all public utilities.^® The prior court opinion was now law. 
In this favorable legal climate, the vigorous growth of solvent 
and successful municipal systems thrived. 
endnotes
 
1. 	 American Public Power Association/ ''The PeopNle's Right
 
to Choose," (1974), p. 4,
 
2. ■ ;'Ibi.dvvP>'­
3. 	 Richard Hellman, Government Competition in the Electric
 
■Utility Industry, (New York, Praeger Publishers. 19721. 
■p. 13-..: 
4. Ibid., pp. 8-10. 
;5..' vlbid., pp.. ld-ll.;:v- -^^ 
6. 	 Ibid., p. 18. 
7. 	 The National Civic Federation Commission On Public 
Ownership and Operation, Report On Municipal and Private 
Operation of Public Utilities. CNew York. 1907), pp. 126-127. 
8. 	 Ibid., pp. 38, 40-42. 
9-	 Oscar Lewis Pond, Municipal Control of Public Utilities,

(New York, The Columbia University Press, 1906), pp. 8-9.
 
10. 	 Ibid., p. 8. 
11. 	 Ibid., p. 16. 
12. 	 Phillip J. Funigiello, Toward a National Power Policy,
CPittsburg, University of Pittsburg Press, 1973), p. 3. 
13. 	 Ibid., p. 33. 
14. 	 Ibid., p. 34. " 
15. 	 Hellman, op. cit., p. 24. 
16. 	 Funigiello, op. cit., p. 36. 
17. 	 Hellman, op. cit., p. 23. 
18. 	 Ibid., p. 25. 
19. 	 Ibid., pp. 84-85. 
20. 	 Ibid., p. 85. 
21. 	 U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical 
Statistics of the United States - Colonial Times to 1970,
Parts I and II, (V/ashington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1975), pp. 457; 827. ' i ' 
 -32­
22.	 Funigiello, op. cit.
 
23.	 Ibid., p. 126.
 
24.	 Ibid., '^p-. 128.
 
25.	 Ibid., p. 128.
 
26.	 Ibid., p. 122.
 
27. Hellman, op. cit., p
 
28i Funigiello, op. cit., p. 132.
 
29. 	Ibid., pp. 137, 153.
 
30. 	Ibid., p. 143.
 
31. 	Ibid., p. 153.
 
32. 	Ibid., p. 154.
 
33. 	Hellman, op. cit., p. 225.
 
34. 	Funigiello, op. cit., p. 125. For example. Senator
 
James Pope wanted the Bonneville System to be modeled
 
after the Tennessee Valley Authority. He proposed
 
legislation to create the Columbia Valley Authority
 
(CVA). Needless to say, his proposal was vehemently
 
attacked by the private utilities and subsequently
 
defeated.
 
35. 	Ibid.v p. 174.
 
36. 	Ibid., p. 193.
 
37. 	A grid system benefits the users by enabling the transmission
 
of electric power from points of abundance to areas of
 
shortage.
 
38. 	Funigiello, op. cit., p. 194.
 
■ I . 	 ■ ■ 
39. 	Ibid., p. 224.
 
40. 	Frederick L Bird, and Frances M. Ryan, Public Ownership ^
 
on Trial, (New York, New Republic, Inc., 1930), p. 37
 
41. 	Ibid., p. 6.
 
42. 	Ibid., p. 5.
 
43. 	Ibid., p. 10.
 
44. 	Ibid., p. 9.
 
. ^
 
 . /
 
-33­
45. Just how successfully the private utilities can muster
 
the necessary political votes is illustrated by the San
 
Francisco case. In February, 19^4, the city filed a
 
petition with the Railroad Commission to determine the
 
just compensation to be paid to the private utilities for
 
their facilities which were to be absorbed by the hew
 
municipal system. After five years of hearings and
 
litigation, a reasonable price could not be set by the
 
Commission and San Francisco is still served by a privately
 
owned utility.
 
46. Bird and Ryan, op. cit., pp. 107-111.
 
47. Ibid., p. 108-11. '
 
48. Platt vs. City and County of San Francisco., 158 Col. 74.
 
49. Bird and Ryan, op. cit., pp. 134-137. '
 
'^/.^XCh:apter-^3 r ■ 
;;y'mtA:;:analys
 
Rates
 
In the continuiBg debate over whether publicly or privately-

owned systems should provide America's electric power needs,, the
 
subject of rates charged to the consumers has always been one of
 
the principal arguments. Advocates of public power systems, the
 
American Public Power Association (APPA), as was mentioned in the
 
introduction, constantly point with pride to the long established
 
fact that publicly-owned sy$tems continue to provide more energy
 
at less cost vis-a-vis the investor-owned systems. Their pub
 
lished statistics for 1972 indicate that the annual consumption
 
by a residential consumer served by a publicly-owned Utility was
 
9630 Kilowatt-hours (KWH) at a cost of $156.95. The average con
 
sumer served by a privately-owned utility, however, used only
 
7391 KWH at a cost of $178.96, which is 48.5% higher per KWH
 
consumed.^ This opinion, however, is not mutually shared by the
 
Edison Electric institute (EEI), the official lobbying organiz
 
ation for America's investor-owned utilities. They claim that
 
the data utilized to support that claim is extracted from the
 
Federal Power Commission's "Statistics of Pub1icly Owned Electric
 
Utilities in the United States "is not complete and, therefore,
 
biased. They further assert that the FPC massages some of the
 
data, that the municipal systems report partial and/or inaccurate
 
statistics, and, more importantly, that the data presented
 
-34- ■ :■ 
v.;; V;.. ^
 
excludes a majority of the public power systems in the Dnited
 
States. They claim that of 1,909 municipal systems in opera
 
tion during 1975, only 433, or approximately 23%, are included
 
in the federal publication.^ A first reaction to this claim
 
would be that the data is being manipulated to present govern
 
ment owned systems in the best of circumstances. Close analysis,
 
however, tends to mitigate this reaction.
 
For example, one of the agencies excluded is the Power
 
Authority of the State of New York, a large wholesaler of
 
primarily inexpensive hydro-electric power. It would appear
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that if this agency's operations were included, the cost of
 
electricity provided by public systems would really be biased
 
towards the low end of the scale. An additional fact is that
 
upon inspection one can observe that the sampling of municipal
 
systems included in the report represents a cross section of
 
the nation. There does not appear to be any cluster of public
 
agencies which might be utilizing relatively inexpensive hydro
 
electric power vis-a-vis systems using more costly fossil fuels
 
for generation. What is excluded, according to my analysis of
 
the California Utilities in the report, are those public
 
entities which are small in size with reyenues under $250,000
 
annually. The exclusion of such data should have minimal impact
 
and bias on any study of nationaT proportion.
 
For the purpose of my analysis on rates within the State
 
of California, I have tried to include the maximum number of
 
publicly-owned utilities and all three of the investor-owned
 
systems. The selection may not totally eliminate any inherent
 
biases, but it should provide meaningful and; fairly accurate
 
■data. 
As of January, 1976, there were thirty-'two publicly-owned 
electric utilities operating in the State. Of this amount, 
seventeen, or 53%, are included in this study. The balance were 
rejected because they either did not report any operating statis 
tics to the Federal Power Commission, they were wholesale suppliers 
only, or they lacked residential retail cus*tomers.^ Additionally, 
in order to make the analysis more comparative, the data pertaining 
to the individual rate classes represents sales to ultimate 
fretail) customers only. All resale power and internally used 
power, both the delivered quantity and the associated revenues, 
have been excluded except in the overall summary. 
In order to make a meaningful analysis and to remove, as 
completely as possible, any inherent biases, the municipal 
systems have been broken down into two exclusive groups or cells, 
as well as analyzed in the aggregate. Also, a further division 
was accomplished to illustrate cost differences apparent between 
the utilities^located in the northern half of the state and those 
in the southern segment. The groupings and the typical monthly 
electric bills as reported by the Federal Power Commission for 
two "typical"^ consumption quantities are presented in Tables 3.1, 
3.2 and 3.3. (For more detail, see schedules 1 and 2 in the 
appendix). 
  
 
 
.:TABLE:';3.i
 
Typica1 Residentia1 Monthly E1ectric Bills
 
In California - 1975
 
iRvestor-Ovrned Private Utility Companies
 
. Typical Monthly Statistics 
' ■ Bill ■ . 
Company (Ra^k Orderiv 500 KWH 750 KWH ■500 KWH 750 KWH 
Pacific Gas ^ Electric (n) $14.66 $19.97 x=$18.01 x=$24.65 
San Diego Gas 6 Electric (s) 17.98 24.88 s=2.779 s=3.755 
So. California Edison (s) 21.40 29.11 n=3 n=3 
(n) = Private Utility in Nprthern California 
(s) = Private Utility in Southern California 
Source: U.S. Federal Power Commission, "Typical Electric Bills ­
■ ■ 1975" ■■ • ■ ;;■ 
;. ■ ■;■ ■ TABLE 3.2 
Typical Residential Monthly Electric Bills 
;in California - 1975 : 
Municipal Systems Without Generation / • 
• ~ ^ """" Typical Monthly Statistics ~ ~ 
. Bill ■ 
System-(Rank Order)* 500 KWH 750 KWH 500 KWH 750 KWH 
Redding (n) $ 6.57 $ 8.59 
Palo Alto (n) 8.91 11.69 x=$14.54 x=$19.54 
Santa Clara (n) 9.40 12.63 
Roseville (n) 9.60 12.40 s=5.500 0=7.566 
Alameda (n) 13.71 18.94 
Ukiah (n) 14.40 19.40 n=10 n-10 
Anaheim (s) 19.41 26.29 
Riverside (s) 20.52 27.39 
Colton (s) 20.61 27.66 
Azuza (s) 22.25 30.43 
(n) = Municipal Utility in Northern California 
(s) = Municipal Utility in Southern California 
Source: 	 U.S. Federal Power Commission, "Typical Electric Bills ­
1975" ,■ ■ -. : ■ , ■ ■ ■ • ■ . • ;.; . ■ 
*Rank order is determined at the 500 "KWH consumption level. 
  
■ TABLE:3;;3 ; 
Typical- Residential Monthly Electric Bills 
In California - 1975
 
Municipal Systems With Generating Capacity
 
. Typical Monthly Statistics 
: ■ ■ ■- - . ■ Bill- . 
System CRanh Order) 500 KWH 750 KWH 500 KWH 750 KWH 
Sacramento (n)
Turlock* (n)
Imperial* (s)
Burhank (s) 
$10.27 
11.54 
15.30 
16.10 
$13.37 
14.86 
21.08 
21.91 
x=$15.51 
s=3.390 
x=$21.29 
. 
s-5.213 
Los Angeles (s) 
Glendale (s) 
16.49 
17.90 
22.77 
25.78 n=7 n-7 
Pasadena (s) 21.00 29.25 
(n)
(s) 
= Municipal Utility in Northern California 
- Municipal Utility in Southern California 
Source: , U.S. Federal Power Commission, "Typical Electric Bills ­
1975" ■ ■ ■ 
* Irrigation Districts 
Prior to analyzing the apparent differences in typical electric bills 
for consumers served by publicly-owned systems versus priVately-held' 
companies, a major point requires some discussion. It is evident 
upon examination of the tables that the consumers located in the 
northern segment of the state enjoy a major advantage over theirs 
southern counterparts in the average cOst of energy consumed. This 
situation exists for all three classes of suppliers, allaeit, muni 
cipal systems have a decided advantage in lower charges to the 
ultimate consumer. The primary reason for this north/south dis 
parity is, it was learned, the availability of relatively inexpensive 
hydro-electric power from many federal and state projects for these 
northern California systems.^ Palo Alto, for example, paid an 
average unit price of 5.1 mils per Kilowatt hour, including wheeling 
" ■ ■ ■ ■ : ■'-3.9- •: ■ ■, :■ . ■ . ■ ■ '' :v^ 
charges paid to Pacific Gas and Electric. This low cost power was 
purchased, under long terra contracts frbin the Central Valley 
Project administered by the U. S. Bureau of Reclaraation. The 
Project also supplies power to Sacramento, Santa Clara, Redding, 
Roseville, Gridley, Biggs, et al, at the same basic rate of 4.5 rails 
per Kilowatt hour, plus wheeling charges.® While Pacific Gas and 
Electric does not receive any power from the Central Valley Project, 
it does receive considerable araoUnts of coraparably priced energy 
from the Bonneville Power Administration, the Colorado River Project, 
and numerous hydro-electric projects owned by itself and government. 
The effect of this influx of inexpensive power is evident in Table 
■3.1,. ■; ' . ■ ■ . 
In contrast, during the same pefiod of time. Riverside, Colton, 
and Azuza were paying an average price of 2.16(f: per KWH for energy 
to their sole supplier, the Southern California Edison Company. 
This higher price is primarily the result of the unavailability of 
inexpensive hydro-electric power to Southern California. For example. 
Pacific Gas and Electric generated 24.6% of its needs hydraulically 
in' 1975 versus 8.7% hydro production for Southern California Edison. 
(See Schedule 4). It should be pointed out, also, that these percent 
ages are additive to any low cost power delivered to those systems by 
Federal and/or state projects. 
With the geographical pricing differences now explained and 
understood to be fairly equally distributed in both the public and 
private systems, we can now examine any apparent pricing differ 
ences to the ultimate consumers. In other words, is it less 
expensive to the consumer to be supplied by a publicly-owned or 
investor owned electric utility? 
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Again, inspection of Tables 5.1 thru 3.3 indicates the 
following order of preferability, at least from the perspective
 
of cost, for a typical ultimate consumer: ^
 
Typical Monthly Cost
 
Choice System 500 KWH 750 KWH
 
1 Municipal W/0 Generation $14.54 $19.54
 
2 Municipal,with Generation 15.51 21.29
 
3 Investor Owned 18.01 24.65
 
It would appear from the ranking above that a municipal system
 
having no generation facilities of its own and relying wholly on
 
purchased power for resale offers the best rates to its customers.
 
As Table 3.2 points out, however, sixty percent of the municipals
 
in this1class enjoy relatively inexpensive federal power while
 
forty percent must purchase considerably more expensive power from
 
the Southern California Edison Company. Such a distribution would
 
tend to skew this average fate to the low side of the continuum.
 
Choice 2, the average of the municipal systems with their own
 
generation and limited supplemental energy purchases, would appear
 
to be the more representative for analysis.® It would appear, then,
 
from the data presented that a consumer served by a municipal
 
djtllity would have a cost advantage of $2.50, or 13.9 percent less,
 
each month if he were to consume 500 KWH of energy and a savings of
 
$3.36 , or 13.6 percent if he were at the 750 KWH consumption '
 
level. It appears that in California, at least, it is advan
 
tageous to the consumer to be served by a public system as
 
opposed.to a private one.
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^ : A of comparing the rates charged by the different
 
utility classes would be to utilize the data as presented in the
 
annual Federal Power Commission Reports. The total revenues ^
 
collected from each customer class (i.e. residential, commercial/
 
industrial, other) could be divided by the total KWH consumed by each
 
class to give the average KWH cost for each. Such data is summar
 
ized in Table 3.4,and the detail can be found on Schedule 3^
 
located in the appendix.
 
TABLE 3.4
 
Summary of Comparative Rates Charged per KWH
 
Average Cost per Kilowatt-hour
 
Type of Utility Residential Commercial/ Other Overall''
 
Industrial
 
Municipal - No Generation $ .0302 $ .0218 $ .0262 $ .0236
 
Municipal - With Generation 
.0295 .0241 .0339 .0250
 
Private (Investor-Owned)
 
.0346 .0268 .0181 .0285
 
Source: Schedule 3, Appendix
 
*Includes power sold for resale
 
The average rates per KWH shown for municipal systems having no
 
generation have been skewed somewhat so that they do not correlate
 
with the distribution of typical monthly bills discussed earlier.
 
This is the result of the inclusion of the City of Vernon's muni-

IT
cipal system-^-^ within that class for this analysis. Because of
 
Vernon's small residential customer group (38 consumers), they were
 
not included in the earlier data by the Federal Rower Commission.
 
Without the inclusion of Vernon, the average rates per KWH for
 
residential, commercial/industrial, and other would be $.0285,
 
0231, and $.0248 respectively. These latter averages correlate;
 
more closely with the data as presented in the typical bill analysis
 
Again, upon inspection of the data in Table 3.4, it appears
 
that the rates charged by municipal systems are more favorable to
 
the consumer in all of the customer classes except "other." As
 
that customer class is primarily highway and street lighting and
 
other similar governmental uses, it is ironical that the private
 
utilities provide better rates for general government uses than do
 
the publicly-owned systems. This may be indicative of the many
 
political ramifications inherent in rate making by elected
 
officials who must approve the rates charged by the publicly-

owned systems. In other words, increase the rates on those
 
items that have minimum impact on getting re-elected.
 
In summary, the data presented suggests that when looked
 
upon as a composite entity, publicly-owned systems provide lower
 
cost power to the ultimate consumers. To find out how this is
 
accomplished, we will have to examine the costs associated with
 
providing power that are incurred by each type of utility.
 
Cost of Service
 
All of the utilities included in this study have reported
 
their operating expenses in the format prescribed by the Federal
 
Power Commission (FPG), albeit, as a review of Schedule 5
 
(appendix) will indicate, some of the municipal systems appear
 
to be careless as to what category they charge particular expenses.
 
Anaheim, for example claims no distribution expense but does have
 
an unreasonably high transmission cost per KWH sold. The jsame
 
situation holds true for Santa Clara. Other such deviations are
 
also apparent: This careless accounting for expenses by type
 
of activity will skew the data presented in the following tables
 
for each specific activity, but it is the total cost per KWIl
 
sold that wili be the more meaningful statistic for comparing
 
operating efficiency. These total values appear reasonable and
 
inclusive of all costs.
 
The FPC system of accounts provides f<^r numerous account
 
distributions associated with operating and maintaining an
 
electrical utility system. For statistical purposes, however,
 
the myriad of accounts are, according to the task performed,
 
grouped into one of five major cost center ca-j-egoj-les. These
 
are Transmission Expense, Distribution'Expense, Customer Accounts
 
Expense, Administrative and General Expense, and Production
 
Expense. These categories represent the five major elements of
 
the utility industry.
 
Transmission Expenses are costs associated with delivering
 
electrical energy from major point to major point within the
 
system, such as from the point of generation to a regional sub
 
station. Distribution Expenses are the costs associated with
 
maintaining and operating the portion of the system that delivers
 
energy from the substation to the ultimate consumer. At times,
 
especially for the smaller municipal systems, the distinction
 
becomes somewhat nebulous and may^account for their careless
 
control of cost accounting.
 
Customer Account Expenses are those costs incurred by the
 
utility for collecting revenues and maintaining customer records.
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It includes such tasks as meter reading, billing, credit opera
 
tions, and similar functions. Administrative and General Expense
 
are those costs related to running the oyerall organization,
 
employee benefits, and all other costs not specifically Assigned
 
to one of the other primary cost centers. It contains the overhead
 
costs associated with running the system. The line of demarcation
 
between Customer Accounts and Administrative and General Expenses
 
is also, at timers, not readily defined and would account for
 
some shifting of expenses between categories.
 
The final major cost center is for Production Expense. This
 
includes generation and/or purchased power expense plus the costs
 
for maintaining generating facilities. It is generally a
 
fairly accurate accounting for all such expenses and shifting
 
to other categories should be minimar, if at all.
 
Table 3.5 provides the summary data for these types of
 
expenses categorized by the three major utility groups we are
 
analyzing. The values are expressed in dollars ($.001 =1 mil)
 
as an expense per KWH sold. For this analysis, the KWH sales
 
also include power sold for resale as all expenses, especially
 
production, would be attributable to total sales.
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Because of the reasons already stated concerning the accuracy ^ 
of the accounting practices utilized by some of the municipal 
systems, only the Production Expense and Total Operating 
Expense per KWH of sales will he discussed. These two unit 
costs appear to be fairly accurate and of meaningful value 
to the analysis. There may, however, be some costs not accounted 
for in the Total Operating Expense; specifically, personnel admin 
istration and general administrative support for some of the 
smaller municipal systems. These costs are contained in the data 
pertaining to all the large systems, such as Los Angeles, Sacramento, 
Riverside, Anaheim, et al, but may not be included in the reporting 
of the smaller cities. It is felt, however, that such biases 
will not significantly alter the results of the study. 
As can be observed from Table 3.5, publicly owned systems
 
with their own generating facilities have the lowest operating
 
costs both for production and overall expense. Second in rank
 
are the privately owned utilities, again in both expense cate
 
gories. In last place, with the highest expense per KWH of
 
sales for both production and overall expenses, are the municipal
 
systems relying wholly on purchased power from other sources. It .
 
is interesting to note that their cost of production (purchased y
 
power) is 68 mils higher, or 64.8 percent greater, than the cost
 
the municipal systems ha\''ing their own generation must pay. How­
ever, as this cost is being expressed as a variable of KWH sales,
 
we will want to examine the line loss factor12 for each type of
 
system. If the municipal systems having no generation capacity
 
{.. . .
 
also have the highest line loss factor, that would explain a
 
 ^ .y;;;.-: y-:;— ■ y: ;;;::, 
portion of the higher cost per KWH sold. Table 3.6 presents 
:these factors'.'/' 
6',
 
Line Loss Factors by Type pf Utility
 
~ ~ Gross Energy ^ Net Energy Line 
Type of Utility Generated and/or Sold Loss Factor 
Purchased (MWH) CJ#rH) (%0 , 
Municipal ­
No Generation 6,519,770 6,229,255 3.38
 
Municipal ­
With Generation 29,251^007 , 26,335,422 9.97
 
Privately-Owned 122,649,509 112,513,539 8.26
 
Source: See Schedules 7, 8, and 9, Appendix
 
As can be observed, these municipal systems without generation
 
have, in the aggregate, the best line loss factor of the three
 
classes of utilit)y ownership under study. The high average cost
 
of purchased power for these municipal systems, then, is apparently
 
the result of pricing policies of the suppliers and the regulatory
 
commission, in this case the Federal Power Commission.
 
Tax Effort
 
A final element of expense to be analyzed is tax payments.
 
For the privately-owned system we will include all taxes paid,
 
federal, state and local, as reported in the FPC "Statistics for
 
Private Utilities For the publicly-owned systems we will use
 
the data as presented in the State Controller's Report labeled,
 
"contributions^to city."!^ The use of two separate source docu­
ments Is necessitated because tlie pPC reports fail to list these
 
in-lieu tax contributions as an expense of the inunicipal systems.
 
Schedule 10 in the appendix illustrates this rather large dis
 
crepancy. The absence of these contributions in the FPC reports
 
mislead many into the philosophy that publicly-owned systems pro­
duce a tax deficiency. A case in point is that the Edison Electric
 
Institute devotes 10 pages in its publication on public power
 
towards this assertion of municipal systems paying minimal, if
 
any, taxes or making in-lieu tax contributions. The fact is,
 
however, at least for most of the California public systems being
 
analyzed in this report, that a significant tax contribution is
 
paid.
 
TABLE 3.7
 
Tax Effort of Utilities in Relation to Sales
 
Taxes/In-Lieu Taxes/In-Lieu Standard 
Type of Utility 
Taxes as a 
of Sales 
Taxes per KWY 
of Sales 
Deviation 
of Taxes as 
a % of Sales 
within class 
Municipal Ownership
 
No Generation
 10.3 $.0024 6.9
 
Municipal Ownership
 
With Generation 4.1
 
.0010 3.4
 
All Municipals
 5.3 .0013 7.5
 
Privately-Owned 8.S .0023 2.2
 
Source: Schedule 6, Appendix
 
As the summary data in Table 3.7 indicates,^the highest tax
 
paying group of utilities are municipal systems lacking generating
 
capacity of their own, both as a percent of sales and as mils per
 
KWH of sales. This class of ownership also has the highest standard
 
deviation which indicates a wide dispersion of in-lieu tax payments
 
for members within that group. A look at Schedule 6 in the Appendix
 
will support this statement. The primary reason for the hig-h in-lieu
 
tax effort, which merely shifts local tax burdens to the consumers
 
of electricity, is that the members of this group are all municipal
 
systems under local control. In other words, the various city
 
councils can divert from these operating funds whatever monies
 
the system can bear, or local ordinances allow. Riverside, for
 
example, pays 11.5 percent of its prior year's revenues to the
 
general fund of that city as a contribution in-lieu of taxes.
 
That formula is stipulated in the City Charter. Because Of the
 
rapid escalation in the cost of electrical energy which we are
 
currently experiencing, the City of Riverside's Public Utilities .
 
Department claims it is now paying approximately 5.6 times more
 
tax than an investor-owned utility w;ith the same service area
 
would have to pay. (See Schedule 6.1 in the Appendix). Another
 
example is the City of Palo Alto. Their Gehepal Fund simply
 
absorbs whatever balance of the revenues are left after all
 
utility expenses have been paid. In the year under study, this
 
practice netted that city's general fund some $3,261,000 or 33.81
 
of the total revenues collected, placing Palo Alto in the position
 
of being the highest tax paying utility as a percent of gross sales
 
within the state. One can argue that such taxing practices are
 
 -50­
inequitable to the consumer but, in juxtopqsition, one can argue
 
that as long as the local policy does not place the municipal
 
system in an uncompetitive position with surrounding investor-owned
 
utilities, the practice lightens the local property taxpayer's
 
burden. It is simply a shift in the incidence of taxation and
 
may be more progressive in its application than the property tax.
 
Municipal systems having their own generation appear to-be
 
carrying a lesser portion of the tax load than their counter
 
parts in both sectors. However, this observance may not hold
 
up under closer scrutiny. Within this class of utility owner
 
ship are three regional systems which serve many cities and towns
 
in a large service area. These three systems, or districts as
 
they are called, are Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD),
 
Imperial Irrigation District (IID), and Turlock Irrigation District
 
(TID). Because they serve such a large geographic area, it.was
 
not possible to determine their true, if any, tax effort. If we
 
were to exclude those three systems from the analysis, the tax
 
effort for this group of utility would become 4.9 percent instead
 
of 4.1 percent.
 
Privately-owned utilities pay higher taxes as a percent of
 
sales than do the municipals with generatioh and slightly less
 
than those municipals having no generating facilities.
 
The data, then, as summarized in Table 3.7, indicates that
 
most publicly-owned systems do, in the aggregate, carry a fair 
, ■ ■ ■ ■ ' : ' ■ • ■ ■ ■ , : ; . A , ■ ■ • ■ ■ ■ , .( • : : ^ ■ ■ . ■ ^ ■ 
share of the local tax burden.
 
Summary
 
At the beginning of this chapter it wa^ determined that
 
municipal systems, on the average, provide lower rates for
 
energy to their consumers. In the latter section of the chapter,
 
the task was to determine how this was accomplished. The results
 
of this analysis are summarized in the following table.
 
Review of the data indicates that the municipal systems
 
having no generation, although they have the highest operating
 
cost per KWH"($.0197 + .0024 = .0271) of sales, offer the
 
lowest rates because the balance Cprofit) they require to pay
 
debt service and make capital improvements out of current income
 
is minimal. On the other hand, the systems with generation, both
 
private and municipal, require larger balances for those same
 
items of expense. In addition, the privately owned firms require
 
a sizable portion of that balance to pay dividends to the stock
 
holders; an expense the municipal systems do not have to bear as
 
each consumer on the system is a shareholder and gets his return
 
in lower rates for energy consumed. Also, in most cases, he
 
enjoys a lower local tax rate because of the utility payments
 
to the general fund. The Southern California Edison Company,
 
for example, paid put of earnings in the year under analysis
 
$120,186,000 to its stockholders. This amounted to 23 mils per
 
KWH of sales. Admittedly, these dividend earnings will generate
 
some additional tax at the State and Federal levels. As such,
 
their exclusion in the analysis of tax effort may be a limitation
 
of this study,vbut hopefully not a significant One. Unfortunately,
 
T
A
B
L
E
 
3
.
8


 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
N
e
t
 
T
a
x
 
E
f
f
o
r
t
 
D
e
p
r
e
c
i
a
t
i
o
n


 
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
C
o
s
t
 
o
f
 
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
P
e
r
 
P
e
r
 
A
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e


 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 U
t
il
it
y 
P
e
r
 
K
W
H
 
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
P
r
o
f
i
t
/K
WH
 
K
W
H
 
S
a
l
e
s
 
K
W
H
 
S
a
l
e
 
B
a
l
a
n
c
e


 
P
e
r
 
K
W
H


 
M
u
n
ic
ip
al
 ­
N
o
 
G
e
n
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
$.
02
36
 
$.
01
97
 
$.
00
39
 
$.
00
24
 
$.
00
10
 
$.
00
05

 
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
 
­
W
i
t
h
 
G
e
n
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
.
0
2
5
0
 
.
0
1
5
6
 
.
0
0
9
4
 
.
0
0
1
0
 
.
0
0
3
0
 
.
0
0
5
4


 
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
l
y
 O
w
n
e
d
 
.
0
2
8
5
 
.
0
1
8
6
 
.
0
0
9
9
 
.
0
0
2
3
 
.
0
0
2
5
 
.
0
0
5
1


 
I

 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
D
e
p
r
e
c
ia
ti
on
 
-
S
c
h
e
du
le
 6
.
2
,
 A
p
p
e
n
di
x 
c
n


 
I

 
this analysis of dividends paid out of earnings cannot be
 
continued to the other privately-owned utilities in this
 
study because of their extensive gas utility operations
 
which are included in the financial dividend data as reported.
 
This point, however, does not change the results as presented.
 
Municipal systems, on the average, provide less costly
 
energy primarily as a result of reasonable operating expenses
 
and no requirement for profits to be distributed out of
 
1 O
 
annual earnings. "
 
 1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

: ENDNOTES :
 
American Public Power Association, "The Peoples Right to
 
Choose,"(December, 1974), p. 6.
 
Edison Electric Institute, "Government Power," (New York,
 
1976) P'ublication Number 76-66, p. 50.
 
Even if the Power Authority of New York's data \ms included,
 
it would not enter into the calculations of the municipal
 
systems as it has no residential or commercial sales.
 
The California municipal utilities exeluded from this com
 
parative study and the associated reasons are as follows:
 
Utility Reason for Exclusion
 
City of Banning Did not report data
 
City of Biggs Did not report data
 
Calif. Dept. of Water Resources No retail customers
 
City of Gridley Did not report data
 
City of Healdsburg Did not report data
 
HetchHetchy Water Supply Project No residential customers
 
City of Lodi Did not report data
 
City of Lompoc Did not report data
 
Merced Irrigation District Wholesale only
 
Modesto Irrigation District Primarily Irrigation
 
Oroville Wyandotte Irr. Dist. Wholesale to PG § E
 
San Francisco P.U.C. Wholesale only
 
Shasta Dam P.U.D. Did not report data
 
Truckee Donner P.U.D. Did not report data
 
Yuba County Water Agency Wholesale to PG § E
 
There is probably no such thing as a typical monthly con
 
sumption pattern. The figures used for consumption are
 
simply averages correlating somewhat to the nationwide
 
averages. As so often happens in the real world, the math­
matical average does not, in fact, exist in that exact
 
numerical quantity.
 
This information was learned by interviewing officials of
 
the Palo Alto Electric Department in October, 1977.
 
Wheeling charges are those expenses paid to another utility /

by the recipient of power for transmitting such power over
 
another's lines from the site of generation.
 
This low cost power will not last indefinitely. The Bureau
 
of Reclamation is currently attempting to increase the base
 
rate from 4.5 mils to 11 mils (l.l<f) per KWH. This new rate,
 
however, will still be approximately 1/3 of the unit cost of
 
power paid by resale customers being served by private

utilities. Los Angeles Times, September 13. 1977. (Vol. XCVI)
 
p. 3, 24.
 
:■ ' ■ -55­
9. 	 Another point of consideration is that these typical rates 
are in effect during portions of 1975. On January 1, 1976 j
the Edison Company, with Federal Power Commission approval,
imposed a 281 overall increase on the Southern California 
municipals it provides with wholesale power. 
10. 	 U.S. Federal Power Comraission, "Statistics of Publicly 
Owned Electric Utilities in the United States,"
(1975).. ^ '■■■ r 
'Statistics of Privately
Owned Electric Utilities in the United States, S-260, 
(1975). 
11. 	 The Vernon system is owned by the city but is actually
managed and operated under contract by the Southern 
California Edison Company. 
12. 	 Line loss factor is that amount of energy, expressed as a 
percent, that is lost to system impedance. It is calculated 
by dividing the difference between system input and output
• by the system input. 	 ­
1'3. 	 The cities of Riverside, Anaheim, Azuza, Colton, et al, 
are currently before the Federal Power Commission and the 
courts seeking relief from this apparent price squeeze. 
14. 	 U.S. Federal Power Commission, op cit., p. 103-104. 
15. 	 State of California, "Annual Report of Financial Transactions 
Concerning Cities of Caiifornia," State Controller's 
Office, (1974-75), pp. 224-227. 
16. 	 Edison Electric Institute, op citv, p. 91-99a. 
17. 	 Riverside Municipal Code. City of Riverside, California, 
- 1304 (TJ, p. C46. 
18 Moody's. Public Utility Manual, (New York, Moody's Investor ;
Service, Inc., 1976) . This manual did segregate the 
annual depreciation according to the major components of 
the firm's revenue (i.e.. Electric, Gas, etc.). Stock 
payments, however, were a total item paid out of all 
income. 
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TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
 
Three hypotheses were stated in the introduction. In
 
Chapter 3, various data were analyzed and placed into equal
 
elements so that we might test the hypotheses as stated and,
 
determine, from the consumer's perspective, if publicly-owned
 
electric systems are advantageous.
 
Revenues
 
The first hypothesis to be tested for statistical signi
 
ficance concerns typical monthly bills for residential consumers
 
using a selected amount of energy each month. Recalling Chapter 1,
 
the null hypothesis for this argument states:
 
Hq: Publicly-owned utility charges for electrical
 
energy consumption are equal to or less than
 
those charges for the same consumption from
 
a privately-owned utility.
 
The alternative of our hypothesis states:
 
H^: Publicly-owned utility charges for electrical
 
energy consumption are more than those charges
 
for the same consumption from a privately-owned
 
utility. ^ /
 
As the data from both of the sample populations is ratio, having
 
both an origin (zero) and a measure of absolute variability,^
 
we will test for statistical significance using_a-parametric test
 
for ascertaining any difference resulting from two independent
 
samples. The'selected formula is:^
 
-56­
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The dollar values for the typical monthly bills under consideration
 
have been presented in Chapter 3 and are tabulated on Schedule 1
 
(Appendix). They are reproduced here for convenience.
 
Table 4.1
 
Typical Monthly Electric Bills
 
Type of Utility Typical Monthly Bill Standard Deviation
 
Ownership 500 KWH 750 KWH 500 KWH 750 KWH N
 
Public^ ­
No Generation $ 14.54 $ 19.54 5.500 7.566 10
 
Public ­
Generation 15.51 21.29 3.390 5.213 ^7
 
Public - All 14.94 20.26 4.770 6.753 ^ 17
 
Private - All 18.01 24.65 2.779 3.775 3
 
Source: Appendix, Schedule 1
 
To test the hypothesis, we will compare the aggregate data for
 
all of the municipals against similar data pertaining to the privately
 
owned utility charges. We will utilize a one-tailed test as we are
 
only concerned with higher costs. It also appears reasonable to
 
test at a 95 percent confidence leVel (oc = .05) whereby we have a
 
5 percent probability of rejecting a true hypothesis. In our
 
first test, using the data as presented for the 500 Kilowatt hour
 
(KWH) consumption level, we calculate a t value^ of 1.552 (See
 
Appendix, Schedule 11). The critical value for this,test 'is 1.734.
 
As the calculated value is less than the critical value, we Sail
 
to reject the null hypothesis. The statistical conclusion' ­
reached, within the parameters as outlined, is that at the 500
 
KWH consumption level, a consumer receives equal or less costly
 
electrical energy from a publicly-owned utility than he would
 
from a privately-owned one. The raw data indicates it would be
 
less. The calculations using the values applicable to the 750
 
KWH consumption class produced the ^ same results. The null hypothesis
 
failed to be rejected and the operational objective was supported
 
(See Schedule 12). The conclusion, then, based on the data as
 
analyzed for residential consumers, was that such consumers paid
 
less for energy if they were supplied by a publicly-owned utility
 
vis-a-vis a privately-owned one.
 
Typical bills, however, are net conclusive evidence of
 
overall less expensive energy rates. Public systems may have
 
lower rates only in the beginning energy blocks^ that were tested
 
in these typical bills and have more expensive units costs in
 
the higher consiamption blocks. To determine if this bias exists
 
in our data, we will apply the same test to the average unit
 
cost for residential service. The data was presented in Table
 
3.5. We will test the higher of the municipal residential
 
averages ($.302 per KWH) found to exist for those public systems
 
having no^generation against the private utility average of
 
$.0346 per KWH. If it is found that statistical significance
 
supports the apparent difference, we can then infer that the
 
still lower rate of $.0295 charged by those muhicipal systems
 
having generation would also be supported as being statistically
 
less. The calculations for this test can be found on Schedule 13
 
 (Appendix). Again, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected and
 
the apparent results that, on the average, residential rates in
 
California are lower if the energy is purchased from a publicly ^
 
owned utility was supported.
 
Similar logic was applied to testing the.,apparent validity
 
that publicly-owned utility rates for commercial and industrial
 
uses were also lower in the average. The t test (Schedule 13)
 
again supported the operational objective of lower rates being
 
charged by municipal systems to the ultimate users, although, in
 
this instance, the apparent charges were only marginally favorable
 
fbr the publicly-owned systems. No tests were applied for the
 
final rate category of "other." The data and discussion as
 
presented in Chapter 3 clearly indicate that the private systems
 
offer better rates in this minor category of sales.
 
Cost of Service
 
) In the introduction, we postulated a hypothesis that the
 
overall cost of maintenance and operations (operational costs)
 
would be equal to or less for publicly-owned systems than
 
for privately-owned utilities. Prior to ev,aluating the results
 
of this analysis on overall cost of service, however, a second,
 
or subordinate hypothesis has emerged that warrants independent
 
consideration and comment.
 
Production Expense.
 
As was presented in Table 3.5, Municipal Systems having no
 
generating capacity of their own and relying wholly on purchased
 
power for resale appear to have the highest unit cost for pro­
duction while municipal systems v/ith generating 'facilities appear
 
to have the smallest unit costs. The distribution of this expense
 
by class of utility ownership was, as you recall:
 
,r ■ ■ ■ , ■ ■' ^ , . ' • . . ■ • ■ . " ■ f 	 ' ' . " ' 
Municipal Ownership - No Generation: $.0173/KWH .
 
Municipal Ownership - Generation: .0105/KWH
 
Privately-Owned .0145/KWH 
 v
 
To determine if these apparent price differentials were statis
 
tically significant, at test for determining such significance
 
between two independent means was applied (See Appendix, Schedule
 
14). The null hypothesis which we'intend to prove states:
 
Hq: 	Publicly-owned utilities have a cost of production
 
which is equal to or greater than the production
 
costs of a privately-owned utility.
 
The logical opposite is:
 
H^: Publicly-owned utilities have a cost of production
 
which is less than the production costs of a
 
privately-owned utility.
 
Our operational parameters where, as in the case of revenues, a
 
one tailed test at the ninety-five percent confidence level = .OS).
 
First to be tested was the apparent cost difference between muni­
'cipal systems without generation and the privately owned utilities.
 
The significant value of t was 1.782 and our calculated value was
 
.875. The decision, therefore, was to fail to reject the null hypo
 
thesis and to conclude that municipal systems relying wholly on pur
 
chased power have a statistically supported higher unit cost per KWH
 
for production expense than do privately-owned utilities. The
 
significance of this finding is important to the future survival of
 
California's municipal utilities who rely wholly on.wholesale
 
purchase of power from privately owned systems. It also supports
 
the concept that the regulatory agency, in this instance the
 
Federal Power Commission (FPC), has an inherent proclivity to
 
lapse into the role of protector for the private interests.^
 
It should be pointed out, however, that "capture" of the FPC by
 
those it is regulating is not implied. What is implied is an
 
apparent weakness in the regulatory process itself. Because
 
only a minor portion of electric sales are interstate (7.3% in
 
1970) and, therefore, under FPC jurisdiction, attempts at esti
 
mating the true costs for this function to set appropriate
 
prices has been subject to a probability of error and a high
 
degree of regulatory ef,fect. Many opportunities to shift costs
 
for price setting tend to dilute the control and expected benefits
 
of regulation.® If one examines the costs of energy borne by
 
the five Southern California municipal systems who rely totally
 
on wholesale power purchases from the Southern California Edison
 
Company, this regulatory failure becomes somewhat illuminated by
 
the disparities evident among the multiple consumers.
 
Table 4.2
 
Southern California Edison Company - Wholesale Power Sales
 
Municipal Utility Edison's*
 City's Edison's Profit In
 
Purchasing Cost/KWH Cost/KWH Profit/KWH Percent
 
Anaheim $.0200 $.0224 $.0024 \ 12.0 
Azuza 
.0200 .0236 .0036 18.0 
Colton 
.0200 .0224 .0024 12.0 
Riverside 
.0200 .0229 .0029 14.5 
Vernon 
.0200 
.0224 .0024 12.0 
*Cost of Generation + Transmission + Administrative fSchedule 5)
 
iSource: Schedule 5, Appendix
 
 This problem, or "price squeeze" is intended to place inordinate ^
 
pressure on such municipal systems in order to force dissatis
 
faction among their consumers. This, in turn, will promote poli
 
tical pressure within the local Jurisdiction advocating the sale
 
of the publicly-owned system to the privately-owned one.
 
These practices are common in areas where the
 
commercial companies have an absolute monopoly
 
• on wholesale power.^ V
 
Overall Cost of Service
 
The tests conducted to validate the hypothesis covering
 
the overall cost of service for municipal systems vis-a-vis
 
privately-owned ones had the following results. The null hypothe
 
sis stated:
 
Hq: 	Publicly-owned utilities have an overall cost of
 
service which is equal to or less ) than
 
privately-owned systems.
 
Our alternative objective was: 	 '
 
Publicly-owned utilities have an overall cost of
 
service which is greater (>•) than privately owned
 
systems. ,
 
As the test was to ascertain the magnitude and statistical sig
 
nificance of greater or less (directional) a one tailed test
 
evaluating two independent means at the 95% confidence level was
 
performed. The results, the details of which are on Schedule 15
 
(Appendix), demonstrate that municipal systems having no genera
 
ting facilities had a cost of service statistically equal to
 
privately-owned utilities per KWH of sales. On the other hand,
 
municipalssystem possessing their own generation also demonstrated
 
an equal overall cost of operations with the privately-owned
 
utilities, but considerably lower than their public soctor counter
 
parts lacMng generation. In the first case, it is obvious
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that the biggest contributing factor to this apparent disparity-

is the high cost of purchased power for these municipal systems;
 
a situation we have already discussed and commented on.
 
Tax Effort
 
The final hypothesis to be tested for statistical signifi
 
cance is on the subject of tax effort by municipal systems vis
 
a-vis privately-owned ones. The intent of this analysis was to
 
disprove the ubiquitous allegation that publicly-owned systems
 
do not carry a share of taxes proportional to those levied
 
against privately-owned utilities. The null hypothesis stated:
 
Hq: 	There is no significant difference in tax
 
effort between publicly and privately-owned
 
. utilities.
 
The alternative hypothesis, or operational statement, stated:
 
Hg;: There is a significant difference in tax effort
 
between publicly and privately-owned utilities.
 
Again, the t test for statistical significance between two
 
independent means was utilized. For this test, however, because
 
we are testing for any appreciable difference in either a
 
positive or negative direction,- a two-tailed test at the 95 per
 
cent confidence level (2.5% in each direction) was utilized. The
 
results, which are detailed on Schedule 16 (Appendix), again are
 
not consistent for municipal systems depending whether or not
 
they have generating capacity.
 
' For the publicly-owned systems lacking generation, there
 
was no significant difference in their tax effort vis-a-vis the
 
privately-owned utilities. Municipal systems having generation
 
however, had a significant difference. Their apparent tak
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effort as a percent of sales was shown on Table 3,8,
 
4.1 percent. The privately-owned utilities had a calculated
 
tax effort of 8.5 percent of sales. As was mentioned in
 
Chapter 3, however, this apparent disparity must be cautiously
 
received because of possible discrepancies in the reporting of
 
the data by such publicly-owned utilities, three of which are
 
multi-regional districts.
 
The more important test was between the tax effort of
 
municipal systems in the aggregate and the privately-owned
 
utilities. In this test, the calculated value of t was insuf
 
ficient to reject the null hypothesis. It can therefore be
 
concluded that the tax effort of publicly-owned systems does
 
not significantly differ from that of the privately-owned
 
utilities. At this juncture, another comment should be made
 
regarding the tax effort of the utilities under study.
 
The publicly-owned systems pay all of their in-lieu taxes
 
or operating surpluses directly to the local jurisdictions
 
in which they operate. In that way, all of the citizen-owners
 
maximize the benefit of public ownership at the local level.
 
The privately-owned utilities pay a substantial portion of their
 
tax effort to the federal government in the form of corporate
 
income taxes. Two comments need be made concerning this form
 
of taxation on a public utility.
 
Because they are regulated monopolies, privately-owned
 
utilities are somewhat assured, over the long term, a
 
rate-of-return on investment. In order to attain this target
 
profit, the utilities estimate the taxes to be paid in a given
 
year and then are allowed, with regulatory approval, to add
 
these anticipated costs to the rates for service. In many
 
cases, however, and this condition did not apply to the
 
California private utilities in the year under analysis, no
 
federal taxes are payable due to operating losses, investment
 
credits, or any other of a myriad of reasons. The effect^ then,
 
is that an estimated tax load has been passed on to the consumer
 
but never paid by the utility. It is now estimated that this
 
"Phantom Utility Tax" adds approximately $1.5 billion nationwide
 
to the charges consumers of privately-owned utilities must phy.^
 
The final comment concerns the degree of benefit the local
 
consumer will accrue from a tax paid to the federal government.
 
There may or may not be any tangible benefit that iS directly
 
attributable to such payments. In juxtapositionj the local in-

lieu taxes paid by the municipal systems have very definite aiid
 
ascertainable benefits. They greatly reduc.e the local taxing
 
effort required and produce tangible benefits in the form of
 
lower local taxes. This is substantiated by an analysis of the
 
State Controller's Annual Report for fiscal 1975 which shows that
 
the weighted average tax rate per $100 of assessed valuation
 
for all California Cities was $2,040 in that year. For California
 
cities possessing their own electric system, however, the
 
average tax rate was $1,449 or 29% less.
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Concerning Cities of California, (State Controller's
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 Chapter 5
 
■ DISCUSSIOR-ANI) CONCLU 
Realization of Purpose
 
In the introduction, three major objectives were postulated
 
which this study was to either support or reject. The positions
 
assumed were:
 
1. 	 Rates for publicly-owned utilities would be lower
 
or equal to those of privately-owned utilities.
 
2. 	 Overall maintenance and operations costs for
 
publicly-owned utilities would be equal to or less
 
per Kilowatt hour of sales than similar costs in
 
curred by privately-owned utilities.
 
3. 	 Both publicly and privately-owned utilities
 
would have a comparable tax effort.
 
The analysis in Chapter 3, validated with tests for
 
statistical significance in Chapter 4, found that, taken in the
 
aggregate, rates were definitely lower in this test year for
 
consumers served by a publicly owned electric system in Calif
 
ornia in comparison to rates for similar service from a privately
 
owned utility. The only area of rates where the privately
 
owned utilities had an apparent advantage in lower rates, was the
 
misceTlaneous category of"other." As this rate type comprises
 
only 2.6 percent of total sales for the privately owned utilities,
 
any positive benefits to the average consumer would be negligible.
 
The inference of the data and the test results is that publicly-

owned utilities have lower rates for residential, commercial, and
 
industrial consumers,/on the average, than do their private sector
 
counterparts.
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Cost of Service
 
The overall cost o:^ service was not consistent when compared,
 
to privately-owned utilities for each group of public systems.
 
For municipal Systems haying no generation, it was found
 
that their average Overall cost of operation was higher than
 
that of the privately-owned utilities. In testing a subordinate
 
hypothesis, however, it was determined that the cause of this
 
apparent higher operating cost was the cost of purchased power
 
sustained by these municipal systems. It was shown and supported
 
that these publicly-owned utilities had a higher cost of pro
 
duction (purchased power) than did either the privately-owned
 
utilities or the publicly-owned systems possessing internal
 
generating capacity. The raw data also indicated that this latter
 
class of utility ownership had the lowest overall cost of
 
operations.
 
This finding tends to refute, albeit not absolutely, the
 
allegation made by the Edison Electric Institute (EEl) in Chapter
 
1. It was their contention that municipal systems who relied
 
wholly on purchased wholesale power from a privately-owned system
 
would reap the benefits of certain economies built into that
 
system by the investors, ergo; they^could purchase power much
 
less expensively than they could generate it themselves. The
 
data analyzed in this study does not support that statement.
 
We find, as was presented in Chapter 3, that publicly-oWned
 
systems having their own generation have average production
 
expenses that are much less than those experienced by the
 
privately-owned systems. Continuing the comparison, we notice
 
 that two publicly-owned systeiris in the same geographie area,
 
both comparable in size and operating statistics, having markedly
 
different production costs. Burbank, which generates its own
 
power at an average cost of $.0181/KWH certainly has an advantage
 
over Riverside which purchases its power from the Edison Gompany
 
at an average rate of $.0229, an increase in expense of 26.5%.
 
(See Appendix, Schedule 5) It's questionable if Riverside is
 
appreciating any of Edison's economies of scaled
 
For publicly-owned systems with generation capacity, the
 
analysis indicated and the statistical tests confirmed that they
 
had lower overall operations costs per KWH of sales.
 
The implications from these results are multifarious, but
 
one deserves comment. If publicly-owned systems are to continue
 
to be viable entities and provide competitively priced energy,
 
they must embark upon a program of acquiring their own generation.
 
To rely solely on purchased power from an investor-owned utility
 
would tend to place them in a non-competitive position.^ A
 
second alternative would be to secure a long term contract for
 
firm, low cost energy from federal or state power projects.^
 
: , . \ \ ;■ , ■ , ^ ■ ; _ • ' 
Tax Effort 
The study supported our hypothesis that public systems , 
vis-a-vis privately-owned systems had comparable tax efforts. 
And, as was mentioned in Chapter 4, those communities having 
municipal systems had a lower tax rate, on the average, than 
did those cities lacking an electrical system. An argument can 
be made against these in-lieu tax contributions in that they 
disguise the true cost of local government, especially if the
 
contribution is in excess of what a private enterprise would
 
pay in local taxes.^ This argument is not valid, of course, if
 
the rates are competitive with other suppliers in the area. If
 
the municipal rates are equal or less than the competition, then
 
a large part of the cost of local government can be shifted from
 
the property tax payer to the user of electricity. This approach
 
may even be more equitable and in keeping with the ability to
 
pay principle.'^ This concept would be especially valid if Roth's^
 
study which correlated higher income to higher energy consumption
 
was relevant to that community.
 
Concluding Remarks
 
Publicly-owned utilities in California have been evaluated
 
and statistically tested in this study. They have been shown,
 
for this test year, to be viable enterprises and worthy of
 
continued support, both locally and nationally. To remain
 
viable, however, they must remain businesslike in nature and
 
insulated from the vagaries of politicians who seek to satisfy
 
short-term goals and reap immediate prestige. This has apparently
 
never been a problem in the past, based on the results of this
 
Study, but it could become a major detriment as sources of revenue
 
for local governments decrease in size. The analysis of municipal
 
utility tax effort indicated that local governments forego no
 
benefits that might accrue from having an investor-owned utility
 
serving their jurisdiction. On an average, the local governments
 
receive equal monetary payments from their own systems for
 
■■ ■ '71-:, , \ :^ 
general government purposes. This contribution, however, should 
never be escalated to the point that the publicly owned utility 
finds itself with rates that are no longer competitive or that 
system maintenance has to be neglected. ^ 
 :■ 	 ENDTOES'^^^- ■ 
1. 	 The cities of Anaheim and Riverside are currently embarked 
upon a program to purchase interest in various power plants
how under either design or construction. 
2. 	 Riverside is currently attempting, through the courts, to 
secure a portion of the power generated at the Navajo Project 
near Page, Arizona. This action is being vigorously contested 
by the Edison Company which now receives a sizable allotment. 
3. 	 : Frederick L. Bird and Frances M. Ryan, Public Ownership oh 
Trial, (New York New Republic, Inc., 1930), p. 47. 
4. 	 For a understanding of this concept of ability to pay, see: 
Harold M. Groves and Robert L. Bish, Financing Government, 
(New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1973),
 
- pp. 16-20.
 
5. 	 William E. Roth, "Micro-Data Measurement of Residential 
Rate Restructuring," Public Utilities Fortnightly,
(97:2, January 15, 1976), pp. 28-34. 
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APPENDICES
 
  
K' ■ SlimRY 
TYPICAL ELECTRIC BILLS - 1975 
SOURCE: FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION REPORT 
Cas o£ 1-1­ Schedule 1
 
Residential (P.7-15) Within Group
 
MUNICIPALS 
500 
KWH 0 
750 
KWH 
(Std. Devia.tion) 
(N) 
(S) 
CS) 
(S) 
(S) 
(S) 
(S) 
(S) 
(N) 
(S) 
(N) 
(S) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
Alameda v 
Anaheim 
Azuza 
Burbank (G) 
Colton 
Glendale (G) 
Imperial (G) 
Los Angeles (G) 
Palo Alto 
Pasadena CG) 
Redding 
Riverside 
Roseville 
Sacramento (G) 
Santa Clara 
Turlock (G) 
Ukiah 
Vernon 
13.71 
19.41 
22.25 
16.10 
20.61 
17.90 
15.30 
16.49 
8.91 
21.00 
6.57 
20.52 
9.60 
10.27 
9.40 -
11.54 
14.40 
No Data 
18.94 
26.29 
30.43 
21.91 
27.66 
25.78 
21.08 
22.77 
11.69 
29.25 
8.59 
27.39 
12.40 
13.37 
12.63 
14.86 
19.40 
Municipals: / 
Southern: 
X = 18.84/25.84 
s = 2.33/3.09 
Northern: 
X = 10.55/13..99 
s = 2.41/3.42 
PRIVATE* 
(S) 
(S) 
CN) 
San Diego G § E 
So. Gal Edison 
Pacific G § E 
17.98 
21.40 
14.66 
24.88 
29.11 
19.97 
Southern = 
X = 19.69/29.00 
Siz5 = 1.71/2.12 
Northern = 
X = 14.66/19.97 
*Average for Service Area (See Schedule 2) 
Averages: 
Municipals: 
No Generation:
 14.54 19.54 5.500 7.566
 
With Generation:
 15.51 21.29 3.390 5.213
 
All Municipals: 14.94
 20.26 4.770 6.753
 
Privately Owned 18.01 24.65 2.779 3.775
 
(N) = Northern California
 
(S) = Southern Califorrnia
 
(G) = Municipal system with generating facilities
 
= mean; S - Standard deviation
 
AT - T
 
X 
   
 
DETAIL - PRIVATELY OWNED
 
TYPICAL electric; BILLS - 1975
 
SOURCE: FEDERAL POWER:Commission report;: ; :
 
(as of l-i-75) Schedule 1.2
 
^ . 	 Standard Deviation
■Owned Averages (Not Weighted) Within 	 Between 
(p. 	7-15) : Company Companies 
; 500 KWH 75R OT 500 KWH 750 KWH 500 KWH 750; KWH 
Ran Diego G§E (10) 
Carlsbad 18..02 24.,92
 
Chula Vista 17.. 70 24.,59
 
Dana Point 18.,02 24.,92
 
Del Mar 18.. 02 24.,92
 
Encinitas 18..02 24..92
 
Fallbrook 18.,46 : 25. 36 265
 .283
 
La Mesa 17. 70 24..59
 
Lakeside 18. 46 25. 36
 
Lemon Grove 17. 70 24..59
 
National City 17..70 24.. 59
 
Total 179. 80 248. 76
 
Average 17, 98 24. 88
 
So. Calif. Edison
 
Walnut 21.92 29. 63
 
Tustin ,; 21.06 28. 77
 
So. El Monte 21.06 28. 77
 
San Bernardino 21., 06 28. 77
 
Orange 21.,46 29.17 374 374 2. 751
 3. 735
 
Muscoy 21.,92 29. 63
 
Los Alamitos 21.. 06 28. 77
 
La Canada 21.,06 28. 77
 
Hemet 21.,46 29.17
 
Colton (SCE) 21.,92 29.63
 
Total 213..98 291. 08
 
Average 21.,40 29.11
 
Pacific 	G8E (10) 
Alum Rock 14.27 19.58
 
Castroville ; 1 02 20.33
 
East Palo Alto 14.27 19.58
 
Grass Valley 14.72 20.03
 
Mendota 15.02 20.33 480 469
 
Orcutt 14.72 20.03
 
Ronnert Park 15.02 20.33
 
San Francisco 13.52 18.83
 
Sohora 	 15.02 20.33 
Wasco 15.02 20.33
 
Total 146.60 199.70
 
Average 14.66 19.97
 
AX-II 
  
By Customer Class
 
(See Jschedules'	 Schedule 2
 
Mean Cost Per KWH Standard Deviation Within Groi
 
Residential Comm/ Other Resi. Comm/ Other
 
Indus.
 Indus.
 
Municipal - No Generation
 
Alameda .0295 .0208 .0299 
Anaheim .0388 .0268 .0257 
Azuza .0449 .0324 .0455 
Colton .0432 .0361 .0286 
Palo Alto .0183 .0128 :.0181 
Redding .0102 .0124 .0203 .0116 0084 .0102 
Riverside .0389 .0295 -0375 
Roseville .0183 .0166 .0162 
Santa Clara .0179 .0120 .0089 
Ukian .0250 .0312 .0170 
Vernon .0402 ; .0242 .0323 
, i 
Group -Total (x) .0302 .0218 .0262 
Municipal 	- Generation
 
Burbank .0337 .0273 .0357
 
Glendale .0383 .0324 .0280
 
Imperial .0268 .0246 .0241
 
Los Angeles. .0348 .0254 .0382 .0090 .0060
 .0076
 
Pasadena .0434 .0330
 .0345
 
Sacramento .0173 .0148 .0208
 
Turlock .0193 .0199 .0165
 
Group Total (x) .0295 .0241 .0339
 
■ ■ . . ( 
Investor-Owned
 
San Diego G8E .0380 .0324 .0175
 
So. Cal. Edison.0418 .0299 .0221 0058
 0041 .0028
 
Pacific G4E .0281 .0228 .0153
 
Group Total (x) ,0546 
.0268 .0181
 
SOURCE: 	 Federal Power Commission, "Statistics o£ Publicly Owned
 
Electric Utilities in the United States (1975), pp. 4R-6R
 
Federal Power Commission, "Statisticeof Privately Owned
 
Electric Utilities in the United Stated, (S-260, 1975) p. 402.
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PRIVATELY-OWNED UTILITIES 
ANALYSIS OF GENERATION MIX § INTERCHANGES 
■ ■ ■ Schedule 3 
Pacific San Diego So. California
 
Gas § Electric Gas § Electric Gas § Electric
 
: MWH., % MWH	 MWH %
 
Generation
 
Steam 24035018 41.2 6908725 76.4 ' 40314586 73.6 
Nuclear 382946 0.7 643574 7.1 2574296 : ■ 4.7 
Hydro '14326968 24.6 4732200 8.7 
Other 3246156 5.6 175047 1.9 36539 0.1 
Total Net Gen. 41991088 72.1
 7727346 85.4 47657621 87.1
 
Purchases 4975673 8.5 ■ ■ ■ ■■ 316443 ■ 3.5 7 ■ 6068552 11.1
 
Net Interchange 11311694 19.4 1005490 11.1 979465 1.8
 
Total*	 58278455 100.0 9049279 100.0 54705638 100.0
 
*Excludes wheeling gains/losses
 
SOURCE: 	Federal Power Commission, "Statistics of Privately Owned V
 
Electric Utilities in the United States, (S-260, 1975} p. 702
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UTILITY'S COST OF SERVICE
 
analysis OF EXPENSES AS A FUNCTION OF GROSS KWH SALES :
 
Schedule 
Trans- Distri Cust. Admin. Gen/Pur 
miss. bution Accts. 8 Gen. Power Total 
MUNICIPALS ­ ' . ■■ -
No Generation 
- . ■ , ■ ,^ , ■ 
Alameda 0 .0018 .0008 .0018 .0157 .0201 
Anaheim .0010 0 .0005 .0008 .0224 .0247 
Azuza 0 .0010 .0007 .0005 .0236 .0259 
Colton 0 .0086 0 0 .0224 .0310 
Palo Alto .0006 .0003 .0003 .0011 .0053 .0076 
Redding 0 .0008 .0005 .0008 .0055 .0076 
Riverside .0001 .0015 .0009 .0014 .0229 .0268 
Roseville 0 .0022 .0010 .0015 .0062 .0109 
Santa Clara .0022 0 0 0 .0102 .0124 
Ukiah 0 .0017 .0007 .0017 .0162 .0203 
Vernon ■ , 0 .0004 .0001 .0001 .0224 .0230 
Class X .0007 .0006 .0004 .0007 .0173 .0197 
V,'.' ■ 
S-.0073 
MUNICIPALS ­
With Generation 
Burbank .0004 .0022 .0009 .0014 .0181 .0230 
Glendale .0001 .0020 .0007 .0019 .0180 .0227 
Imperial .0003 .0016 .0008 .0018 .0144 .0189 
Los Angeles .0004 .0023 .0011 .0022 .0116 .0176 
Pasadena .0007 .0020 .0008 .0021 .0196 .0252 
Sacramento .0002 .0011 .0005 .0011 ,0049 .0078 
Turlock .0000 .0017 .0007 .0017 .0028 .0069 
Class X .0003 .0020 .0009 .0019 .0105 .0156 
S=.0062 
PRIVATELY-OWNED 
Pacific G8E .0003 .0018 .0008 .0015 .0106 .0150 
San Diego G§E .0006 .0013 .0009 .0021 .0207 .0256 
So. Cal Edison .0007 .0012 .0006 .0018 .0175 .0218 
Class X .0005 .0015 .0007 .0017 .0145 .0189 
S=.0042 
Standard Deviation - Total Cost per KWH 
Municipals - No Generation S=,0078
 
Municipa1s - With Generation S=.0061
 
Privately Owned S=.0043
 
SOURCE OF DATA: See Schedules 7, 8 and 9
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UHLITY'S COST OF SERVICE
 
analysis OF TOTAL TAXES (OR IN-LIEU TAXES) AS A
 
FUNCTION OF KWH SALES AND GROSS SALES
 
Gross Gross Taxes/(I) Taxes Taxes Per Std. Df 
Elec. Sales In^Lieu As % KWH Sold Taxes £ 
Sales (MWH) M$ Sales $ : % Sale: 
MUNICIPALS ­
No Generation 
Alameda 7918 333041 800 ■ 10.1 '.002 
Anaheim 43016 1451294 4323 10.0 .003 
Azuza 4536 124292 799 17.6 .006 
Colton 3004 79051 418 13.9 .005 S=6.9 
Palo Alto 9656 695972 3261 33.8 .005 
Redding 2652 229306 310 11.7 .001 
Riverside 29072 875320 2085 7.2 .002 
Roseville 2054 118142 430 20.9 .004 
Santa Clara " 13206 1013956 2139 16.2 .002 
Ukiah 1888 69310 265 14.0 .004 
Vernon 31839 1309571 567 18.0 .0004 
Totals: 148841 6299255 15397 
Class X 10.3 .0024 
MUNICIPAL^ ­
With Generation 
Burbank 20872 713266 1459 7.0 .002 
Glendale 22389 652773 2285 10.2 .004 
Imperial 
Los Angeles 
27518 
447875 
1080863 
16267804 
N/A 
19029 4.2 
• 
.001 
: S=3.4 ' 
Pasadena 25627 714343 2341 9.1 .003 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■ ; 
Sacramento 70462 6246692 534 0.8 .0001 
Turlock 11822 659681 . ■ : ; n/av 
Totals: 626565 26335422 25648 ; 
Class X 4.1 .0010 
PRIVATELY OWNED 
Pacific G6E 1216080 52868212 10824(2) 8.4 .002 
San Diego G§E 283224 8317821 12277(2) ■ ■ 4.3 .002 S=2.2 
So Cal Edison 1559076 51327506 144478 9.3 .003 
Totals: 3058380 112513539 258579 
Class X 8.5 .0023 
Combined Total 
All Municipals 
775406 32634677 41045 5.3 .0013 S-7.5 
Source of Data: Schedules 7, 8 and 9 
(1) 	Taxes paid by private firms are as reported to the Federal Power
 
Cpmmissionj taxes paid by public systems are as reported to the
 
State Controller.
 
(2) 	SOURCE: Moody's Public Utility Manual, 1976.
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GOMPARISON OF UTILITY PAYMENTS TO GENERAL FUND
 
; ELECTRIC FUND V '' ^
 
BUDGET YEAR 1977-78
 
' VCltY:V • .:yyInvestor-Gvm,ed■ 
V' Utility 
Gross Revenue $39,335^000 , $39,335,009 
Contribution to General Fund 3,514,000* / --­
Property;■ Tax ■ 
Net Utility Plant @ 100% Inside City
Assessed Value @ 251 
City Tax Rate @ $1.01 per $100 
County Tax Rate @ $2.75 per $1(
Other Agencies Taxes @ $7.243 per $100 
Total Taxes $11,003 per 
A ; 
30,500,000
' 7,625,000 
77,013 
209,688 
552,279 
$ 838,980 
2?i Franchise Tax 
^ Operating Revenues = 
$39,335,00 X 
^ 
' 
2Vx 70% = 
; 
550,690 
total taxes payable ^ $ 3,514,000* V $ 1,389,670 
TOTAL TAXES PAYABLE TO CITY GENERAL FUND $ 3,514,000 $ 627,703 
City utility pays 5.6 times as much to City General Fund as an investor-
owned utility. 
*Based on prior year' s^ gross revenue exciuding fuel cost surcharge.
Does not include approximately $1 million paid for services rendered 
by other departments and for City Hall debt service. 
AV-II 
COST OF SERVICE 
ANNUAL DEPRECIATION RATE ON ELECTRIC PLANT 
..A'.; :;V ■ ; • •/. 
ScJieUule 5.1 
Annual Gross 
Depreciation Sales Per KWH 
(M$) (MWH) Sales 
MUNICIPAL 
No Generation 6174 6299255 $.0010 
With Generation 78885 26335422 
.0030 
PRIVATE 281165 112513539 .0025 
Source of Data: 
Municipal Systems Schedules 8 and 9 
Private Systems Moody's Public Utility Manual, (New York, Moody's 
Investors Service, Inc., 1976) p. 884, 1469, 2047. 
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FEDERAL POWER CCMII^SION
 
STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY O^TOD ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE U.S. - 1975 S-260
 Schedule 7 
Pacific Gas 
Gross Utility Plant
 
Net Utility Plant
 
Revenues:
 
Residential
 
Comm-l/Ind.
 
Other
 
Total Revenue*
 
Expenses:
 
Transmission
 
Distribution j
 
Customer Accts. § Sales:
 
Admin § General
 
Generation/Purch. Power
 
Total Expenses
 
Interest on Debt 204,445 
Taxes - Other 
Income (Net) 
Total Taxes 
■ 
128,303 
4,868 
133,171 
Depreciation 
, : '! :: : ■' " ; ■ . ■ . . . 
Number of Customers: 
Residential 
Comm'l/Ind. 
■Other. ■ 
Total 
■MWH'Sales:' 	• ­
Residential 
■	 Comm\l/Ind. 
Other ; 
TotaT Sales - Ultimate 
Gross Sale (Inc. Resale)
MIVH Gen/Purchased (p 702) ­
*Resale Data not Included Above 
tesale: ■ : 
' 	 MWH' 2,590,095 
Revenue (M$} ; ; 52,478 
Rev. Per KWH ($)	 .0203 
CALIFORNIA
 
§ Electric San Diego Gas 6 Electric So. Gal. Edison Totals Percent
 
4,806,718 749,708 4,486,864 10,043,290
 
5,905,981 867,686 5,998,022 10,771,689
 
^ 465,818' 117,723 546,389 1,147,930 37.5 
713,923 ; 151,143 955,279 1,830,345 59.8 
36,339 4,358 39,408 80,105 2.7 
1,216,080 283,224 1,559,076 3,058,380 100.0 
15,004 4,775 34,079 53,858 2.5 
92,601 10,636 61,438 164,675 7.7 
43,099 7,147 31,962 82,208 3.9 
80,138 17,756 92,426 190,320 9.0 
562,486 172,572 900,024 1,635,082 76.9 
793,328 212,886 1,119,929 2,126,143 100.0 
34,055 126,185 364,685 
16,731 93,636 238,670
 
557 50,842 56,267
 
17,288 144,478 294,937
 
178,947 28,593 120,492	 328,032 
2,566,292 542,888 2,412,878 5,522,058 87.7
 
389,159 62,990 302,100 754,249 12.0
 
13,996 693 ; 5,562 20,251 0.3
 
2,969,447 606,571 2,720,540 6,296,558 100.0
 
16,582,796 3,101,853: 13,493,385^ 33,178,034 31.3 
31,314,339 4,966,422; 31,960,143 68,240,904 64.5 
2,380,982 ^ 249^119 1,785,869 4,415,970 4.2
 
50,278,117 8,317,394 47,239,397 105,834,908 1M70
 
52,868,212 8,317,821 51,327,506 112,513,539
 
58,494,398 9,049,279 55,105,852 122,649,509
 
427 4,088,109 6,678,631 Line Loss « 8.261 
16 97,438 149,932 X cost per KIVH«.0133 
.0375 .0238	 ,0225 
Federal Power Coinmission
 
Statistics of Publicly-Owned Electric Utilities in the U.S. - 1975
 
Schedule 8
 
Retail - With Generation Burbank Glendale Imperial* Los Angeles* Pasadena Sacramento* Turlock* Totals
 
California - 1975
 
Gross Electric Plant 
Net Electric Plant 
83,927,670 
35,923,127 
105,742,569 
59,652,677 
109,968,093 
56,926,647 
2,276,943,107 
1,804,508,513 
90,685,388 
44,183,087 
808,977,591 
722,081,336 
76,924,358 
66,122,422 
3,553,168,776 
2,789,397,809 
Residential 
Coinm»l/Ind. 
Other 
Total Operating Income 
$ 5,680,634 
13,857,209 
1,353,929 
20,871,772 
9.107,607 
12,333,698 
948,068 
22,389,373 
12,069,422 
13,418,091 
2,030,153 
27,517,666 
153,567,689 
278,525,057-^ 
15,782,632 
447,875,378 
8,340,546 
16,026,327 
1,260,454 
25,627,327 
35,187,564 
34,464,741 
810,048 
70,462,35# 
5,472,259 
6,021,407 
328,827 
11,822,493 
229,425,721 
374,646,530 
22,494,111 
626,566,362 
36.6 
59.8 
3.6 
100.0 
Ejcpenses:: 
Transmission 
Distribution 
Customer Accounts 
Admin. § Gen'l 
Generation/Purchased Power 
Total Expenses 
In-Lieu Taxes 
Depreciation (Annual) 
287,214 
1,543,101 
633,439 
980,321 
12,906,385 
16,350,460 
1,459,203 
2,540,630 
81,003 
1,307,944 
441,884 
1,255,772 
11,760,955 
14,847,558 
12,985 
3,152,891 
357,645 
1,687,216 
831,617 
1,987,131 
15,527,605 
20,391,214 
27,076 
3,117,880 
6,558,930 
37,532,939 
18,595,633 
36,449,204 
189,467,490 
288,604,196 
- 3,404,775 
47,937,275 
494,641 
1,452,270 
568,977 • 
1,515,010 
13,971,319 
18,002,217 
11,548 
2,753,711 
1,234,914 
6,792,229 
2,835,659 
6,682,520 
30,553,429 
48,098,751 
■ --533,864 
18,227,362 
27,259 
1,113,100 
447,842 
1,094,421 
1,866,501 
4,549,123 
0 
1,154,847 
9,041,606 
51,428,799 
24,355,051 
49,964,379 
276,053,684 
410,843,519 
5,449,451 
78,884,596 
2.2 
12.5 
""5.9 
32.2 
67.2 
100.0 
Interest on Debt 408,538 1,282,314 292,538 58,911,495 692,388 25,068;399 1,305^772 87,961,444 
Net Income (Reported) $ 957,195 5,486,070 4,210,346 73,545,6527 5,181,236 1^^002,336 5,458,396; 110,841,231 
Number of Customers: 
Residential 
Comm*l/Ind. 
Other 
Total Customers 
37,916 
5,328 
28 
43,272 
54,449 
9,210 
33 
63,692 
36,222 
6,964 
1,518 
44,704 
959,793 
152,486 
5,355 
1,117,634 
43,111 
7,023 
10 
50,144 
239^293 
28,688 
90S 
268,886 
27,853 
3,840 
3,354 
35,407 
1,398,637 
213,539 
11,203 
1,623,379 
86.1 
13.2 
0.7 
MVH ^ Sales 
Residential 168,592 238,006 450,783 4,415,201 192,280 2,034,017 283,377 7,782,256 32.5 
Comm'l/Ind, 
Other 
507,315 
37,359 
380,874 
33,893 
545,552. 
;84,078 
10,969,831. 
413,320 
485,494 
'36,569 
2,334,463 
38,951 
302,766 
19,968 
15,526,295 
644,138 
64.7 
2.8 
Total Sales (MVH) ; 
Gross Sales (Inc. Resale) 
MWH Gen/Purchased 
713,266 
713,266 
747,109 
652,773 
652,773 
688,493 
1,080,413 
1,080,863 
1,217,216 
15,798,552 
16,267,804 
17,828,468 
714,343 
714,343 
810,779 
4,407,431 
6,246,692 
7,229,741 
606,111 
659,681 
729,201 
23,972,689 
26,335,422 
29,251,007 
100.0 
*Resale sales not included in data above. 
Resale $ 8,851 2,352,866 28,588,565 312,125 31,262,407 
r' nm 450 469,452 1,839,261 53,570 2,362,735 
Rev per IGVH ($) .0197 .0050 .0155 .0058 .01323 
X per KWH = .0094 
Line Loss = 9.97^ 
  
 
California - 1975
 
Retail - No Generation
 
Gross,Utility Plant
 
Net Utility Plant
 
Revenue:
 
Residential
 
Comrn*1/Ind.
 
Other
 
Total Revenues (Sales)
 
Expenses:
 
Transmission
 
Distribution
 
Customer Accounts
 
Admin. 8 General
 
Purchased Power
 
Total Expenses
 
In-Lieu Taxes
 
Depreciation (Annual)
 
Number of Customers:
 
Residential
 
Comm'l/Ind.
 
Other
 
Total # Customers 
MWH Sales 
Residential 
Comm'l/Ind. 
Other 
Total MWH Sales 
MWH Purchases 
Interest on Debt 
Net Income* (Reported) 
Alameda
 
8,268,905
 
5,406,909
 
3,115,969
 
4,576,271
 
226,175"
 
7,918,413 

0
 
600,285
 
254,416
 
601,899
 
5,243,557
 
6,700,157
 
■ /o ­
229,010 
22,908
 
2,216
 
25,130 
105,546 
219,928 
7,567 
333,041 
343,499 
o" . 
1,168,106 
Anaheim
 
45,327,737
 
34,396,721
 
13,337,136
 
29,186,675
 
492,681
 
43,016,492
 
1,423,723
 
0
 
785,596
 
1,154,259
 
32,507,872
 
35,871,450
 
■ - ■■ ^O" : 
1,390,463 
61,707
 
7,379
 
183
 
69,269 
343,913
 
1,088,218
 
19,163
 
1,451,294
 
1,511,808 
402,900 
6,334,541 
Azuza
 
4,857,526
 
2,571,415
 
1,640,832
 
2,702,310
 
192,628
 
4,535,770
 
0
 
124,607
 
93,206
 
66,551
 
2,929,590
 
3,213,954
 
104,015
 
163,083
 
8,309
 
1,138
 
■ 'I.: v' - :^9l■^ 
9,538 
36,569 
83,486 
4,237 
124,292 
130,878 
^ 1,062,711 
Colton
 
179,059
 
153,302
 
1,188,739
 
1,640,232
 
174,919
 
3,003,890
 
0
 
682,282
 
0
 
0
 
1,767,590
 
2,449,872
 
188,060
 
:; :25,757
 
6,294 
915 
574 3 
7,783 
27,536 
45,401 
6,114 
: 79,051 
87,156 
75,998 
329,770 
Schedule 9
 
Palo Alto
 
26,764,422
 
18,010,476
 
2,152,728
 
7,088,987
 
414,374
 
9,656,089
 
407,049
 
208,644
 
207,876
 
796,296
 
3,708,744
 
5,328,609
 
0
 
1,014,959
 
21,126 
2,364 
112 
23,602 
117,879 
555,178 
22,915 
695,972 
728,339 
12,053 
; 3;516,496 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
Califoinia - 1975 (Continued) Schedule 9.1 
Redding , Riverside Roseville Santa Clara Ukiah Vemon Totals 
8,057,446 
5,186,154 
45,054,230 
33,269,941 
3,189,547 
2,127,233 
31,546,534 
23,650,077 • 
2,347,015 
1,357,555 
14,423,748 
5,254,24i 
190,016,169 
131,384,024 
$ 984,395 
1,611,454 
56,431 
2,652,280 
12,025,639 
15,487,300^ 
1,558,864 
29,071,803 
1,004,623 
1,008,732 
41,089 
2,054,444 
3,344,678 
9,654,074 
207,546 
13,206,298 
948,872 
892j134 
46,581 
1,887,587 
5,906 
31,460,520 
372,634 
31,839,060 
26.7 
70.8 
; 2.5 
100.0 
39,749,517 
105,308,689 
4,783,920 
148,842,126 
0 
175,572 
122,568 
184,730 
1,263,962 
1,746,832 
■: ■ ■■ ■ ■ •0 . . 
281,294 : 
73,559 
1,300,774 
783,034 
1,221,298 
20,045,656 
23,424,321 
1,486,275 
■■ , 
0 
257,694 
113,775 
181,930 
735,177 V 
1,288,576 
■ ■ .v■^0' :■ :■■■v■ 
82,196 
2,213,882 
0 
0 
0 
10,382,789 
12,596,671 
907,339 
0 
117,017 
47,073 
115,162 
1,121,525 
1,400,777 
0 
72,493 
■ 7,368 
512,437 
62,620 
137,319 
29,325,317 
30,045,061 
619,682 
521,280 
■ .3.3 : 
-' 3.2 , 
2.0 
3.6 
87.9 
ipd-0 
4,125,581 
3,979,312 
2,470,164 
4,459,444 
:109,031,779 
124,066,280 
911,757 
> 6,174,149 
6,948 
2,386 
192 
9,526 
51,285 
4,397 
211 
55,893 
7,243' 
945 
2 
8^190 
■ 
: 
30,540 
4,513 
: i5Z 
35,185 
3,905 
- 1,103 
49 
5,057 
38 
1,912 
70 
2,020 
87.7 
11.8 
0.6 
100.0 
: 220,303 
V 29,268 
■■ 1,622 
251,193 
96,570 
129,956 
2,780 
229,306 
243,989 
• Q­
617,173 
309,089 
524,664 
41,567 
875,320 
912,480 
596,985 
4,116,746 
54,868 
60,743 
2,531 
118,142 
■ 125,269 
■ ' ■ 0' 
689,040 
-
186,700 
803,817 
23,439 
1,013,956 
1,036,638 
2,720^ 
1,275,945 
;; 
/ 
: 
38,012 
28,563 
2,735 
69,310 
76,450 
'^O ■/ 
415,651 i 
■147::■-: : 
l,297,884 : 
11,540 
1,309,571 
1,323,264 
1,379,659 
20.9 
76.8 
2.3 
100.0 
1,316,829 
4,837,838 
144,588 
6,299,255 
6,519,770 
1,090,656 
20,905,838 
X cost per KWH purchased - $109,031,779 
= .01672• 6,519,770,000 
Line Loss =3.38% 
Analysis of 
Gontributions to General Fund (In-Lieu Tax) 
PPG Report vs. State Gontroller's Report PY 1974-75 
NOTE: 74-75 Operating Stats 
supplied to PPG as 1975 
Gal. State 
Gity/DistriCt 
PPG Stats 
1975 
Gontroller 
1974-75 Amount 
VARJANGB 
Alameda 800,000 800,000 
Anaheim 4,323,302 4,323,302 
Azuza 104,015 799,300 695,285 668.4 
Burbank 1,459,203 1,459,203 
Golton 188,060 417,815 229,755 122.2 
Glendale 
Los Angeles 
12,985 
3,404,775 
2,284,931 
19,029,000 
2,271,946 
15,624,225 
17,496.7 
458.9 
Palo Alto " 3,260,566 3,260,566 
Pasadena 
Redding 
11,548 2,341,278 
310,229 
2,329,730 
310,229 
20,174.3 
Riverside 2,085,407 2,085,407 
Roseville 430,000 430,000 
Santa Glara 2,138,951 2,138,951 
Ukiah 265,000 265,000 
Vemon 619,682 567,482 
TOTALS: 5,800,268 40,512,464 34,712,196 +598.5 
Source of Data: ■ 
U.S. Federal Power Gommission, "Statistics of Publicly-Owned Electric Utilities in the United States,"
 
(1975), p. 4R - 6R. •/; ,
 
State of Galifomia, "Annual Report of Financial Transactions concerning Gities of Galifomia," State
 
Gontroller's Office (1974-75), p. 224-227.
 
  
Schedule 11
 
Statistical t Test
 
Two Independent Means
 
Average Private Utility bill compared to average of all public systems,
 
500 KWH.
 
Hq: Publicly-owned utility bills are equal to or less
 
Hg^: Publicly-owned utility bills are more
 
Formula: fx. - xO
 
's,- _ S- ­
Data: Municipal 	 Private
 
X,= $14.94 Xj.= $18.01
 
S,= 4.770 S,= 2.779
 
N,= 17 . N^= 3
 
ri4.94 - 18.011 ^ 3.07 3.07 = 1.552, d.f. =.18
 
t =/22.753 ^ 7.723 / 3.913 " 1.978
 
y 17 3 ^ ,
 
Significant value oft @ 18 d.f.^^^ = 1.734
 
Calculated 	value = 1.552
 
Decision: 	Failed to reject Hq; Publicly-owned utility bills
 
appear to be lower
 
(1) 	Source: C. WiMiam Emory, Business Research Methods, THomewood,
 
Illinois, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1976). pp. 390-1.
 
(2)	 Source: ^ James L. Bruning and B. L. Kintz, Computational Handbook
 
of Statistics, (Glenview, Illinois, Scott, Foresman.and Company,
 
1977), p. 241.
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Schedule 12
 
Statistical t test
 
Two Independeiit Means
 
Average Private Utility\bill compared to average municipal utility
 
bill - 750 KWH.
 
Hypothesis Same as Schedu1e 11
 
Formula; Same as Schedule 11
 
Data: Municipal	 Private
 
ic,= 20.26	 x^= 24.65
 
S,- 6.753	 S^- 3.755
 
N,= 17	 N^= 3
 
120.26 - 24.631 = • 4.:39:- : 4.39 = 1;616, d.f. 
-18
 
t = /45.60 ^ 14.10 /7.;382:;;:,:.v: / 2.717i.
 
17
 
Significant value Of t § 18 d.f. = 1.734
 
Calculated value =1.616
 
Decision: 	Failed to reject Hq; Publicly-owned utility bills
 
appear to^ be/:lower.l ': ^', y,
 
AVIII-Il
 
  
 
 
 
Schedule 13
 
Statistical t Test
 
Two Independent Means
 
Hypothesis: Same as Schedule 11
 
Formula: Same as Schedule 11
 
- - - - - Residential - - - - ­
Data; Municipal - W/0 Gen. Private
 
X,= .0302 X;.= .0346
 
S,= .0116
 S.= .0058
 
N,= 11
 
t = 1.0562 - .03461 10044
 ^ .0044 , 977y d.f. =12
 
.ooqi
 00003 
.00002 ~ .0045
 
11
 
Significant value o£ t @ 12 d.£. = 1.782
 
Calculated value = .977
 
Decision: Fail to reject Hgi Publicly-owned utility charges
 
. are lower per KWH
 
- - - - - Commercial/Industrial - - - - ­
Data: Muriicipal - W/Gen.
 Private
 
;x .0241:
 x^= .0268
 
s;= .0060
 Si= .0041
 
N^= 3;
 
C.0241 - .02681
 
.0027 
-_ .0027 .844, d.£.,= 8
 
t =
 
.00004
 00002 J .00001
 
.0032
 
Signifleant Alalue o£ t @ 8 d.£ = 1.860
 
Calculated value = .844 ­
Decision, Fail to reject Hq; Publicly-owned utility rates are
 
; lower per KWH.
 
AVIII-III
 
ocneauJ-tJ xh
 
Statistical t Test
 
Two Independent Means
 
1.	 Average cost o£ Production per KWH - Municipal System without
 
generation vs. Privately-Owned systems.
 
Ho; Publicly-owned systems production costs are equal or greater
 
Ha^ Publicly-owned systems production costs are less
 
Formula: Same as Schedule 11
 
Data: Municipal - W/0 Gen	 Private
 
x,= .0173 Xj.= .0145
 
S,= .0073 S^= .0042
 
N = 11 Ni= 3
 
t = r.0173 - .0145i 
.0028 0028 ^ .875, d.£. = 12
 
.00005 .00002 .00001 0032
/ 11 /
 
Signi£icant value o£ t § 12 d.£ = 1.782
 
Calculated value o£ t = .875
 
Decision: Fail to reject Hqj Publicly-owned systems lacking

their own generation have higher production costs per KWH.
 
AVIII-IV
 
 Schedule 15
 
.Statistical t Test
 
Two Independent Means
 
HQ. Publicly-owned utili^ overall operations costs are equal or less
 
Hg.: Publicly-owned utility overallfoperations costs aro more
 
1. 	 Average cost of operations per KWHr municipal systems without
 
generation vs. privately-owned systems. V
 
Formula: Same as Schedule 11
 
Data: Municipal - W/0 Gen
 Private
 
;i'-.;. ' ': ' .'iDiQ-7'-.
 iCst,- .0180 ^
 
S,= .0078 Si.= .0043i:
 
, ' = ll^ - ­
t 	= r.0197 - .01891 .0008 ^ .0008 _ .250, d.f. 12
 
00006 00002 /.OOOOl .■.oo-32;;-i -. ■ ;vv: '^
 
11
 
Significant va'lue of t @ 12 d.f =1.782 
Calculated value of t = .250 
Decision: Fail to reject Hq. Publicly-owned systems without 
generation have overall operational costs which are equal to 
those of privately-owned systems. 
Average cost of operations for municipal systems with generation 
vs. privately-owned systems. 
Data: Municipal - W/Gen	 Private 
icj = .0156	 x^= .0189 
S, = .0061	 Si= .0043 
N^= 3 
t 	= r.0156 - .01890 .O033_ ^ .0033 X 1.031, d.f. = 8
 
i- 00004 .00002 /.00001 .0032
 
Significant value of t § 8 = 1.860 :
 
Calculated value of t = 1.031
 
Decision: Failed to reject Hq; Publicly-owned systems with
 
generation have lower overall operations costs.
 
AVIII-V 
  
Tax Effort as a percent of sales (Two-tailed test @ 95% confidence level):
 
1. 

2. 
3. 
Statistical.- t Test
 
Two^ Indep-endent-' Means-^ .; '
 
Hq: There is no significant difference in tax effort.
 
Ha*. There is a significant difference.
 
Municipal system without generation vs.. privately-owned system.
 
Formula: Same as Schedule 11
 
Data: Municipal - W/0 Gen 	 Private
 
X j = 10.3 	 - Xi= 8.5
 
■ S,= 6.9 	 Sj= 2.2 
N.= 11 ' ■ ■' ■y'-yr'- : 
t = no. 5 - 8.51 1.8 1.8 ■ ■ _ .739, d.f. == 12 
/ 47.6 , 4.84 ~ /5.94 ' 2.437' " 
. : V: "IT- * "I— ■ ■ ■ 
Significant value of t @ 12 d.f. = 2.179 
Calculated value of t = .^739 
Decision: Fail to reject ; no significant difference exists 
whereby local municipal systems have an equal tax effort as a 
perc,ent"'of-sales-. 7' . 
Municipal systems with generation vs. privately-owned systems. 
Data: • Municipal - W/Gen 	 Private - ­
. ■ 	 X, = 4.1 7 Xj_= . '8.S". . 
S, = 3.4 S^= 2.2 
N, = 7 3. ;^ ^ 
t = r4.1 - 8.5i 4.4 _ 4.4 2.435, d.f. = 8^^ : ' 
/II.57 - 4. 84 /3. 266 ~ 1.807 
V 7 ■ 3 ^ 
Significant value of t @ 8 d. f. = 2.306
 
Calculated value of t = 2. 435 ^ ^ ^ ,
 
Decision: Reject Hq: A significant difference in tax effort as
 
a percent of sales exists.
 
Aggregate total of all municipal systems vs private systems. 
Data: Municipal 	 Private 
: - .X,= -5.3, x^ = 8.5 
S, = 7. 5 Sj^ = 2 . 2 
N, = 18 ■ ■ N^= 3 : ■ 
t = 15.3 - 8.51 _ 3. 2 : 3.2 1.470, d.f. = 19 
^56. 25 ^ 4.84 ~ /4.738 " 2.177 " A"18~~ ■'■■~3~~ ■ ■ 
Significant value of t @ 19 d.f. =2.093 
Calculated value of t - 1.470 
Decision: Fail to reject Hq; there is no difference in tax effort 
in the aggregate. • 
